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"It's one thing having them pick' Wally said carefilly. "I
mean, everyone accepts them, but they're only migrants-
they're transients.They're supposed to move on " '
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the Federal District Court for the District of Maine had
the opportunity to apply the provisions of the Migrant and Seasonal Ag-
ricultural Worker Protection Act (Act).' The Act is the result of an
increased tension between the need for labor in the agricultural sector
and the need to protect the fundamental rights of a class of workers who
are by nature particularly vulnerable. The Act's remedial effectiveness,
however, depends upon judicial interpretation. Consequently, in order for
the Act to be applied effectively and advance Congressional intent, each
court must study the manner in which the courts of all fifty states have
interpreted the Act's provisions. A federal statute by its very nature is an
attempt to provide a common jurisdiction and remedy among the states.
Uniformity of application is especially important when providing reme-
dial protection to a class like migrant workers who roam from state to
state. In its application of the Act, the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maine failed to perform this study.
In the past, the Maine courts appeared to be willing to broadly in-
terpret remedial statutes that protect farm workers.3 The Federal District
Court for the District of Maine, however, has veered off course and run
aground in search of the "plain language" of the statute. Its decisions in
the two cases discussed below demonstrate that it has lost sense of the
purpose of the Act. It is looking for "bright-lines" and "black letters"
where none exist. In doing so, the district court has significantly disturbed
the balanced tension that the Act has created. That is, the Act offsets the
agricultural industry's increasing use of migrant labor with remedial pro-
tections for the migrant workers. Indeed, a study of the history of the Act
1. JOHN IRVING,THE CIDER HOUSE RULES 519 (1985).
2. 29 U.S.C % 1801-1872 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. DeCoster Egg Farms, Inc, No. 80-0134 P 1982 WL
2165 *1 (D. Me. Feb 23, 1982) (stating that it is the employer's burden to produce records
in "useable form" as required by FLSA); State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891 (Me. 1995) (hold-
ing that the relationship between the employer and employee was one of a landlord/tenant
even though the employees did not pay a rent and that employer was liable for purpose of
the Civil Rights Act). It should be noted that subsequent to the Act, the state legislature
has continued to vigorously pursue remedies for injuries to workers that resulted from
their employers' abuse. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 5§ 585, 586, 588 (West Supp.
2000) (the Housing Standards for Agricultural Workers defines an owner of such housing;
applies standards identical to those in the MSWPA; and makes violation of the standards a




and its common law applications reveals that the object of the Act is to
protect a valuable but vulnerable class of people.4
It is the purpose of this Comment to explore current judicial inter-
pretations of both the language and intent of the Act. Part II explores the
legislated relationship between the federal government and farmers and
reviews the history of migrant worker legislation. Part III outlines the
most salient features of the Act. Part IV presents common law interpreta-
tions of the terms that the current legislation contains. In light of these
interpretations, Part V analyzes the application of the Act in two recent
decisions of the Federal District Court for the District of Maine. Finally,
Part VI places these decisions within the context of the developing legal
trends that attempt to balance the protection required by an increased
migration of workers with the satisfaction of the commercial growers'
incessant demand for labor. National, regional and international organiza-
tions have suggested alternatives that try to grapple with the same
questions:Where does the class of migrant laborers fit in the overall legal
structure of a sovereign country or state? What duties does the state owe
these workers? And, what is their legal relationship to the state? Needless
to say, these questions cannot be answered in the limited space of this
Comment. Nevertheless, the answers to these questions give guidance to
the courts as to how much discretion they may utilize in handing down
remedies to victims of violations of the Act.
This Comment concludes that the recent Maine federal district cases
represent an irreconcilable spike in a national and international trend to
afford more protection to a vulnerable class whose resources are the ob-
ject of urgent demand. However, the search for a proper remedial weight
in the balance between migrant worker protection and the provision of
competitive farm labor is not a new problem.
II. LOOKING BACKWARD AT AN ONCOMING TRAIN
Historically, the government has taken a protective stance toward the
farming industry. First, with respect to the growers, it offered subsidies and
created programs that facilitated access to national and foreign labor pools.
Then, as the industry developed, it became increasingly dependent upon
transient workers who were coming from beyond the immediate confines
of the farm. The government found it necessary to address the needs of
these agricultural laborers by establishing protective and remedial
provisions that were specifically directed at the unique circumstances of
the migrant worker. A study of evolving legislation shows that ready
4. See generally Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999); Almendarez v.
Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1985); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp,
Inc., 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. Coastal Growers Ass'n, 598 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1979).
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availability of migrant labor increased a need for remedial provisions
intended to compensate workers for injuries inflicted by abusive growers
and labor contractors. These compensatory measures were intended to be
liberal enough to effectively deter such transgressions.The Act reflects the
most recent stage of a long legislative evolution.
The introduction of four acts, in 1862, initiated the continuing affair
between the small-scale farmer and the United States legislature.' First,
the Homestead Act permitted the acquisition of as much as 160 acres of
public land for one dollar and twenty-five cents "per acre for the purpose
of actual settlement and cultivation" provided the farmer remained on the
land for five years.6 Second, the Morrill Act donated what amounted to
"thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative in Congress" to
the independent States of the Union. The States were to sell the land in
units of one hundred and sixty-acre lots for $1.25 per acre. The proceeds
were used to fund at least one agricultural college in the State to develop
a class of farmers knowledgeable about the most advanced agricultural
techniques.' Third, the Pacific Railway Act was enacted for the purpose of
creating a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri River to the Pa-
cific Ocean.1" Consequently, in an attempt to ensure that the graduate of
the agricultural school had something to grow when he got off the train
and stepped foot onto his homestead, Congress set up the Department of
Agriculture "to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new
and valuable seeds and plants."" These enactments created a powerful lob-
bying force in Congress that wore two faces, each of which represented a
distinctly different view of the farming occupation and its relation to the
United States economy. 12
A. The Janus Face of Agriculture
In the first seventy-five years of U.S. political history, the "Southern-
Western" and "New England-Midwestern" models represented two very
5. See generally, Guadalupe T Luna, "Agricultural Underdogs" and International Agree-
ments: The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. Ray. 9,
20 (1996);Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. Rv. 1261,
1274 (1995).
6. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 218-221) (re-
pealed 1976).




10. Act ofJuly 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
11. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, § 1, 12 Stat. 387 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
2201 (1994)).
12. Chen, supra note 5, at 1276.
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different agricultural philosophies requiring different types of labor. 3 The
"Southern-Western" model of an agrarian economy, which promoted the
production of "cash-crops for distant markets," depended upon cheap la-
bor for its competitive edge.'4 Slave labor and the recently land-stripped
migrant workers from Mexico provided that edge.'" Additionally, slavery
added to the initial strength of agrarian interests because the "Framers"
formula for apportioning House seats and direct taxes counted three-fifths
of each state's slave population. 6 This partial counting of slaves, in turn,
reinforced the agrarian interest in slavery for its political as well as eco-
nomic advantage. 7
Unfortunately, the subsequent abolition of slavery and eventual reap-
portionment case law-extolling a "one man, one vote" system of
representation in lieu of one based upon acreage-failed to toll the death
knell for agricultural subsidies.' The continued presence of the Mexican
migrant worker in the West/South-West region and the tenant-farmer in
the South kept the system afloat.'9 Furthermore, there was another agri-
cultural image which also attracted Congressional support.
In addition to the commercial concept of agrarian economy, there
has always coexisted a concept that envisions "small farms producing food
crops and livestock for subsistence and local markets."2 This "New
England-Midwestern" model of agrarian economy fosters an idyllic image
of the struggling bucolic who labors to provide the Nation with
sustenance." This "family farm" ideal intervened to protect the
agricultural sector and continues today to receive government subsidies
13. Id. at 1278.
14. Id. For those lacking an agrarian background, "cash-crop" is defined as "a crop
cultivated primarily for its commercial value." THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY 218 (2d ed. 1996).
15. Chen, supra note 5, at 1278.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 states that:
[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their re-
spective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id.
17. Chen, supra note 5, at 1276.
18. Id. at 1278-79 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961)) (recognizing the justi-
ciability of constitutional challenges to apportionment under State law); see also Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that apportionment of Congressional seats by popula-
tion is commanded by U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, cl. 1); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(requiring numerically balanced representation in State legislatures as a matter of equal
protection).
19. Chen, supra note 5, at 1279.
20. Id. at 1278.
21. Id. at 1308.
FALL 2001]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
like loan preference22 and exemptions from labor standards.2 3 During
Reconstruction, these subsidies promoted the maintenance of black
sharecroppers and migrant workers as a steady and deep pool of cheap
labor.24 When black sharecroppers left the fields en masse, Latin American
migrants rushed in to fill the gap.2"
B. The Introduction of the Migrant Worker to the US. Workforce
Traditionally, agriculture has attracted immigrants of many nationali-
ties, but these workers' ambitions to purchase land threaten the established
landowners who, in turn, lobby vigorously for exclusionary immigration
laws.26 Protections against foreign migrant competition are also in place
for the U.S. migrant workers, who predominately work in the rural
southern states.27 Nevertheless, the persistent shortage of unskilled cheap
labor at home presents an urgent need for which the foreign migrant
22. Id. at 1308 n.327.
23. See id. at 1281 n.146 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1988)) (excluding agricultural
employees from the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of 29 U.S.C. §5 206-
207 (1988)) and comparing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988) (excluding farm laborers from the
National Labor Relations Act).
24. Chen, supra note 5, at 1282.
25. Id. at 1307.
26. Id. at 1321 (discussing the 1882 ban on Chinese immigration (The Chinese Ex-
clusion Act) and later prohibition ofJapanese landownership in California and elsewhere
in the 1920s).
27. For an interesting and short explanation of the proper procedure to be followed
by a farmer who requests foreign labor, see Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan, 508 F2d 493 (1st
Cir. 1974) describing the necessary procedure:
[t]he Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., permits
the admission of aliens to serve as temporary agricultural laborers if do-
mestic workers are unavailable. The Act defines as a 'nonimmigrant' an
alien who '... is coming temporarily to the United States to perform
temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of performing
such service or labor cannot be found in this country ... " 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii).
Id. at 495.
However, to insure that all available U.S. migrant laborers be considered, the Inter-
state Clearance System (ICS) for recruitment of agricultural workers was established by 20
C.ER. 5§ 602.2 and 602.9, under authority of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 49 et
seq. "The ICS is one element of a complex statutory structure designed to facilitate the
employment of domestic workers for seasonal agricultural labor, and to permit the use of
foreign nationals temporarily admitted to the United States to work for a specific em-
ployer if domestic workers are unavailable" Elton Orchards, 508 F.2d at 495. In Elton
Orchards, Judge Coffin found that it was not discriminatory to require that a New Hamp-
shire apple grower use laborers from Louisiana before the preferred laborers from the
British West Indies because protection of domestic labor was the sinew and organ of im-
migration law. See id. at 499-500.
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worker offered a ready solution.28 That is, the laborer is there when you
need him and gone when you do not. 9 As a result of a series of travesties,
the Mexican laborer has presented himself as the most appropriate candi-
date for the task.
3 °
After the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo at the close of the United
States-Mexican War, many Mexicans found themselves landless and poor.3
That same year the Gold Rush flooded California with money-hungry,
land-grabbing prospectors who "railroaded" the indigenous Mexican
population.32 Murderers and squatters went unprosecuted and taxes were
raised to a level that essentially expropriated land owned by Mexican citi-
zens. 3  Nevertheless, although there was a general disdain for Mexicans in
the Southwest, after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,"4 they were solic-
ited as an alternative source of cheap labor.3" Chinese immigrants had
been the main source of labor in the development of the railroad. 6 Con-
sequently, the railroad industry turned to the Mexican migrant worker to
substitute for the diminished Chinese labor pool.37 Then, the development
of advanced irrigation techniques and the expansion of fruit and vegeta-
ble farming, particularly the sugar beet industry, pulled the migrant
workers into the Mid-Western States.3 8 Meanwhile, the bloody Mexican
Revolution 39 displaced a large segment of Mexican citizens who flocked
to the U.S. industrial sectors to such an extent that by 1928 eighty per-
cent of the Burlington Railroad workers were Mexican. 40 This condition
persisted through the Depression. 41 World War II, however, brought an end
28. Chen, supra note 5, at 1285.
29. Id.
30. See generally DENIS LYNN DALY HEYCK, BARRIOS AND BORDERLANDS: CULTURES OF
LATINOS AND LATINAS IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
31. See id. at 4. The United States-Mexican War was fought between 1846-1848 and
culminated in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. See id. As a result of the Treaty, the United
States absorbed the former Mexican territories of California, Arizona, New Mexico and
other southern lands. Id.
32. Id. at 4-5.
33. Id. at 5.
34. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).The Act suspended any immi-
gration of "Chinese laborers to the United States." Id. Originally it was to last for ten
years. Id. After many extensions, however, it was finally repealed in 1943 by the Chinese
Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600-601.
35. See DALY HEYCK, supra note 30, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also Chen, supra note 5, at 1285.
39. See DALY HEYCK, supra note 30, at 5. The revolution of 1910-1917 was spear-
headed by PanchoVilla in the North and Zapata in the South.
40. Id. This phenomenon may have been due, in large part, to the oppressive "dust
bowl" drought, the Depression, and rapidly increasing mechanization.
41. Id. at 6.
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to the Depression and created an insatiable appetite for labor in the agri-
cultural sector.42
In 1942, the United States and Mexico agreed to the "bracero" pro-
gram to relieve the labor shortages in the farming industry.43 Formed by
the Farm Labor Service, the "bracero" program provided for the entrance
into the U.S. of "controlled numbers of Mexican nationals" to be em-
ployed as seasonal agricultural workers. 4' The workers were to return to
Mexico when they had completed their work." The program lasted until
1964 and was the conduit for the entry into the United States of five mil-
lion Mexican workers who provided the U.S. agricultural community
with a controlled temporary source of low cost labor.46 The program,
however, ultimately failed because of the abusive treatment inflicted on
the workers by the growers. 47 Complaints by the Mexican government,
the recession of 1953, and the threat of increasing numbers of Mexican
immigrants led to the 1954 Operation Wetback initiative, which author-
ized the return to Mexico of one million Mexicans.
48
C. A Legislative Adjustment of the Balance Between
Labor Supply and Labor Protection
Less than ten years after Operation Wetback, the U.S. enacted the
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963 (FLCRA).49 That legis-
lation attempted, among other things, to curb the abuses of Farm Labor
Contractors (FLCs) who were exploiting the vulnerabilities of illegal im-
migrants working as migrant workers."0 Farmers unable to find local
temporary harvesters often turned to FLCs to supply foreign workers."1
The FLCs, however, capitalized on the financial, cultural and linguistic
dependencies of the migrants and often subjected them to unhealthy and
42. Id.
43. Id. "Bracero" derives fiom the Spanish "brazo" meaning "arm." Even today,
bracero is translated as "unskilled worker" or "laborer." See also William M. Ross, The Road
to H-2A and Beyond:An Analysis of Migrant Worker Legislation in Agribusiness, 5 DRAKE J. AG-
Pic. L. 267,269-70 (2000).
44. Daly Heyck, supra note 30, at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7 (noting that some growers "even charged rent for the trees under which
the migrants slept").
48. Id. See also My FAMiLvy / Mi FAmILIA (New Line Cinema 1995) for a graphic ex-
ample of U.S. citizens of Hispanic descent who were swept back to Mexico in the
irrational furor of the times.
49. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, Pub. L. No.88-582, § 2, 78 Stat. 920
(1964) (codified as 7 U.S.C. 5§ 2041 to 2055 amended in 1974, repealed by Pub. L. No.
97-470,TideV, § 523, 96 Star. 2600 (1983)); see also Ross, supra note 43, at 270.
50. Ross, supra note 43, at 270.
51. Id.
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unsafe conditions. 2 The FLCRA held the FLCs liable to local and state
health and safety regulations." The FLCRA also proposed to offset by law
the unequal bargaining power of all migrant workers, foreign or domestic,
by imposing a mandatory registration with the Department of Labor
(DOL) and a full disclosure to the migrant laborers of working conditions
including housing, transportation, and wage."
In 1974, the FLCRA was amended to include harsher penalties
and increase enforcement "by creating a cause of action for migrant
workers who were deprived of their statutory rights."5 Coverage of the
FLCRA was extended to anyone who benefited from migrant workers.
5 6
The amendment accomplished its expanded scope by listing seven
exemptions, among which were nonprofit organizations, farmers who
only use migrant workers in their own operation, and the farmers'
employees who might find migrant workers on "an incidental basis." 7
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920,
921-23 (1964). It must also be remembered that contemporaneously the migrant workers
themselves were taking steps to even the playing field. See DALY HEYcK, supra note 30, at 7. In
1965, C6sar Chivez organized the United FarmWorkers Union in California. Id. His use of the
boycott and fasting is thought to have been instrumental in the enactment of the California
Labor Relations Act of 1975. Id.The California Labor Relations Act states:
It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to encourage and
protect the right of agricultural employees to fll freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, to ne-
gotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and to be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection. For this purpose this part is adopted to provide for collective-
bargaining rights for agricultural employees.
Cal. Lab. Code § 1140.2 (West, 2000). On the national level in 1966, the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 was amended "to raise minimum wages and extend protection to agricultural em-
ployees." Ross, supra note 43, at 273 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1938), amended by Pub. L. No. 89-
601, § 101, 80 Stat. 830 (1966)), but see generally Michael H. Leroy, "Agricultural Laborers" Continue
to be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Aa?, 48 EMoRy LJ. 489 (1999).The amendment,
however, excluded family members and daily commuters who worked on a "piece rate basis"
for a period of less than thirteen weeks in "the preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1938),
amended by Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 101(a), 80 Stat. 830,830 (1966).
55. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-518,
14(a), 88 Stat. 1652, 1657 (repealed 1983).
56. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-518,
§ 2,88 Stat. at 1652-53.
57. Id. The expansion was accomplished by listing the following seven exemptions
from the Act:
(1) Any nonprofit charitable organization, public or nonprofit private
educational institution, or similar organization;
Michigan journal of Race & Law
Finally, as if to acknowledge the growing dependence on foreign migrants,
the FLCRA was also amended to require that the information be
conveyed to the worker in a language that he would understand."8 In
1983, the Act repealed the FLCRA, 9 eliminating the need to register as
FLCs and making the farm employer jointly liable with the FLC for
meeting the Act's mandates.
60
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MSAWPA
Section 1801 of the Act paints remedial and protective purposes with
broad strokes. 61 The Act's objectives are threefold: "[(1)] to remove the re-
straints on commerce caused by activities detrimental to migrant and
seasonal agricultural workers; [(2)] to require farm labor contractors to
register ...; and [(3)] to assure necessary protections for migrant and sea-
sonal agricultural workers ... 61
Section 1802 is one of the most significant sections of the Act be-
cause it defines the terms of the statute. 63 This Section defines an
(2) Any farmer, processor, canner, ginner, packing shed operator, or nurs-
eryman who personally engages in any such activity for the purpose of
supplying migrant workers solely for his own operation;
(3) Any full-time or regular employee of any entity referred to in (1) or (2)
above who engages in such activity solely for his employer on no more
than an incidental basis;
(4) Any person who engages in any such activity (A) solely within a
twenty-five mile intrastate radius of his permanent place of residence
and (B) for not more than thirteen weeks per year;
(5) Any person who engages in any such activity for the purpose of obtain-
ing migrant workers of any foreign nation for employment in the
United States if the employment is subject to-
(A) An agreement between the United States and such foreign nation;
or
(B) An arrangement with the government of any foreign nation under
which written contracts for the employment of such workers are
provided for and the enforcement thereof is provided for through
the United States by an instrumentality of such foreign nation;
(6) Any full-time or regular employee of any person holding a certificate of
registration under this Act; or
(7) Any common carrier or any full-time regular employee thereof engaged
solely in the transportation of migrant workers.
Id.
58. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
518,§ 10, 88 Stat. at 1655 (1974).
59. 29 U.S.C. % 1801-1872 (1997).
60. Ross, supra note 43, at 274.
61. 29 U.S.C. 1801.
62. Id.
63. 29 U.S.C. 1802.
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"agricultural employer" as "any person who owns or operates a farm,
ranch, processing establishment, cannery, gin, packing shed or nursery ...
and ... either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any
migrant or seasonal agricultural worker"
6
"Agricultural employment" in addition to retaining its previous
definition pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)," also
includes "the handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing,
freezing, or grading prior to delivery for storage of any agricultural or
horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state" 66 A "migrant agri-
cultural worker" is one who is "employed in agricultural employment of a
... temporary nature, and who is required to be absent overnight from his
permanent place of residence."67 It is important to note that the scope of
"agricultural employment" is very broad.
In referencing the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Act implic-
itly accepts the definition of "agricultural work" as expressed by the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which contains a wide variety of work
not immediately identifiable with the traditional concept of "farming." ' 8
64. 29 U.S.C. 1802(2).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 203(0 provides the following:
"Agriculture" includes farming in all its branches and among other things
includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production,
cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural
commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities
in § 1141(g) ofTitle 12), the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals,
or poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or lumbering opera-
tions) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for
market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation
to market.
Id.
66. 29 U.S.C.§ 1802(3).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A).The term does not, however, include an immediate family
member of the employer or farm labor contractor. Id. Nor does it include "temporary
nonsmimgrant alien[s]" who are authorized to work in the agricultural sector pursuant to
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a):
having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform
agricultural labor or services, as defined by the Secretary of Labor in
regulations and including agricultural labor defined in § 3121(g) ofTitle
26 and agriculture as defined in § 203(0 of Tide 29, of a temporary or
seasonal nature and 8 U.S.C. ch. 12 § 1184(c) (prescribing the procedure
for importing an alien as a nonimmigrant for purposes of employment).
Id.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(3) (referring to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 3121
(g) for the definition of"agricultural work" and to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. S 1101(a)(15)(H) for definition of a "temporary nonimmigrant alien who is
authorized to work in agricultural employment"). 26 U.S.C. § 3121(g) states that the term
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The scope of what constitutes a "farm" is equally as broad as what consti-
tutes "farming" 69 A "farm labor contractor" is defined as "any person ...
who, for any money or other valuable consideration paid or promised to
be paid, performs any farm labor contracting activity" 70 and "farm labor
contracting activity" includes "recruiting, soliciting, hiring, employing,
furnishing, or transporting any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker."
7 1
Section 1803 of the Act exempts those who contract farm labor
solely for the benefit of their or their family's agricultural business regard-
less of the legal status of the business.7 2 This Section also exempts those
who are employed by an agricultural business that did not employ more
than 500 man-hours for agricultural labor in any quarter of the preceding
year, the "Small business exemption."7 3 Finally, the Section generally ex-
cludes common carriers, labor organizations, nonprofit charitable
organizations, local contracting, custom poultry operations, and the like,
"provided the employees of the operation are not regularly required to be
away from their permanent place of residence other than during their
normal working hours."
74
thorized to work in agricultural employment"). 26 U.S.C. § 3 12 1(g) states that the term
"agricultural work" includes all services performed on a farm, in the employ of any per-
son, in connection with cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting
any agricultural or horticultural commodity, including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring
for, training, and management of livestock, bees, poultry, and fur-bearing animals and wild-
life. The Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(H) refers to 26 U.S.C.
§ 3 12 1(g) for a definition of "agricultural labor" and to 29 U.S.C. § 203() for a definition
of"agriculture:" 29 U.S.C. § 203() defines "agriculture" as
includ[ing] farming in all its branches and among other things includes
the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation,
growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or commodities ... , the rais-
ing of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices ...
performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction
with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery
to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.
29 U.S.C. § 203(o.
69. Id. A farm "includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animal, and truck farms,
plantations, ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used primar-
ily for the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities, and orchards." Id.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(7).
71. § 1802(6). On the other hand, an "agricultural employer, an agricultural associa-
tion, or an employee of an agricultural employer or agricultural association" cannot be a
"farm labor contractor." 5 1802(7). In all cases a "person" includes "any individual, partner-
ship, association, joint stock company, trust, cooperative, or corporation." § 1802(9).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).




Sub-chapter I, § 1811-15,11 of the Act provide the general require-
ments for a certificate of registration: issuance, determination of
acceptance, expiration and renewals, and notice of change.7 6 The mechan-
ics outlined in these sections determine whether the farm labor
contractor will qualify for the benefits offered by the United States Em-
ployment Services created by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933."
Subchapter II, § 1821 of the Act presents the "information and re-
cordkeeping requirements" for the labor contractor of migrant
agricultural workers. The most important of these requirements mandates
written disclosure to potential employees of their duties and benefits,
posting of these requirements in a language understandable to the em-
ployee and the proscription of "knowingly providing false or misleading
information."78 Sections 1822 and 1823 list the employer's responsibilities
with respect to wage agreements and taxes, as well as safety and health
protections for the workers. 71 Subchapter III applies the same require-
ments outlined in subchapter I to the seasonal agricultural worker?,'
Subchapter IV adds more protections for both migrant and seasonal
agricultural workers." Sections 1841 and 1842 address two common
sources of abuse-transportation safety and unauthorized contracting.
82
Section 1841 sets out the type of "transportation subject to coverage:' the
criteria for regulation, the amount of required insurance, and the effects of
state workers' compensation coverage.83 Section 1842 prohibits the em-
ployment of workers supplied by a contractor without first "tak[ing]
reasonable steps" to verify that the contractor is certified for the activity
he is being used. 4 Finally, subchapterV provides enforcement measures.8
These provisions offer both a potentially powerful shield against
abuses and a readily available remedy for violations. Nevertheless, although
a very important source for legislative protection for the rights of the mi-
grant and seasonal workers, the Act rings hollow without judicial
clarification. The following Section looks at the history of judicial inter-
pretation and application of the Act. It presents examples of the most
common circumstances under which a cause of action is brought and
75. §§ 1811-15 (excluding §1816, which was repealed on Nov. 6.1976).
76. Id.
77. 29 U.S.C.§ 49.







85. %§ 1851-56, 1861-63,1871-72.
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various courts' analyses of these circumstances in applying the definitions
and protective provisions of the Act.
8 6
IV A COMMON LAW RENDITION OF THE MSAWPA
One commentator suggests that Congress has tacitly deferred to the
common law interpretation of the Act.87 With this in mind, it should be
remembered that common law generally accepts that the requirements
and protections of an Act that is remedial in nature should be construed
liberally.8 On the other hand, its exemptions should be narrowly con-
strued. 9 These principles should guide the court at every stage of the
action irrespective of the specific remedial statute or procedural rule being
applied.
The basic form of review is no different than any other judicial ac-
tion. Often, violations of the Act will have caused injury to a group of
workers and, consequently, the plaintiffs will file for certification of a class.
Regardless of whether the class is certified, the court will determine
whether the basic requisite elements of the Act are met. In doing so, the
court will determine whether the plaintiffs are "migrant" or "seasonal"
workers "employed" in an "agricultural activity" or are independent con-
tractors. The court will then determine whether the defendants were
employers bound by the Act, whether farm labor contractors were in-
volved, and whether the FLC qualifies as a joint employer with the
farmer. The court then will apply the provisions of the Act to validate the
claim or claims, and, if necessary, determine the damages. It is in the inter-
pretation of the individual remedial provisions where the court must shift
from a "business as usual" mode to that of a "protector" of the particular
class of people for whom the Act was drafted. As a protector it must inter-
pret both substantive as well as procedural laws broadly to the advantage
of the vulnerable class.
86. For the purpose of clarity, when discussing the cases, the term "Act" will be ap-
plied to represent both the FLCRA and the MSAWPA.The former was the foundation
for the latter and the latter was simply an extension of the remedial measures provided in
the former.
87. See generally G. M. Buechlein, What Constitutes 'Agricultural Employment' Subject to
Provisions of Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 91 A.L.R. 735 (1989).
88. E.g. Charles v. Burton, 169 E3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999);Almendarez v. Bar-
rett-Fisher Co., 762 E2d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1985); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp,
Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 234 (7th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. Coastal Growers Ass'n, 598 F2d 521,
525 (9th Cir. 1979).
89. See generally Flores v. Rios, 36 F3d 507, 510 (6th Cir. 1994); Bracamontes v.Wey-




A. Rule 23:The Common Law Remedial Application
Courts commonly accept the class action as an appropriate means of
handling cases under the Act." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure number
23 allows a class action suit if certain requirements are met.The Rule 23
prerequisites of"numerosity," "commonality," "typicality," and "adequacy of
representation " '9 lose their apparent facial clarity. However, when viewed
under the remedial nature of the Act. Generally, these prerequisites are
cumulative and without them a motion for class certification will not suc-
ceed.9 2 Some interpretations assert that the Act requires only that an
employee represent "others similarly situated," and thus waive the other
prerequisites." Consequently, what exactly is required to meet the initial
four criteria for certification of a class action is far from transparent when
applying it to alleged violations of the Act.
In light of the remedial nature of the Act, courts have granted them-
selves considerable leeway in determining the degree necessary to comply
with these requirements.94 For example, in determining how many mem-
bers constitute a sufficient number to represent a class, it is not necessary
that a specific number be alleged or that each member's identity be
known at the time of the motion. 9 Courts have chosen to focus not on
the numerical aspect of the first prerequisite, but rather on a pragmatic
comparison between joinder and the inconvenience of individual law-
suits.
96
90. E.g., Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F2d 1341, 1350 (5th Cir. 1986); De La Fuente, 713
F.2d at 231.
91. FED. R. Cv. P 23(a).The first prerequisite addresses "numerosity" i.e.,"the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Id. Secondly, there must be
"commonality," which requires that "questions of law or fact common to the class ... ex-
ist." Id. The third requirement calls for "typicality" by mandating that "the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Id.
Finally, "the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class," or in other words there must be "adequacy of representation." Id.
92. See Rodriguez by Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672 F Supp. 1009 (WD.
Mich. 1987); Haywood v. Barnes, 109 ER.D. 568,575 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
93. Leyva v. Buley, 125 ER.D. 512, 514 (E.D. Wash.1989) (referring to 29 U.S.C.
§216(b)).
94. E.g., Montelongo, 803 F.2d at 1351; Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers
Ass'n, 765 E2d 1334, 1350 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Haywood, 109 FR.D. at 575-92 (par-
ticularizing the characteristics of the threshold requirements and analyzing plaintiff's class
under such requirements).
95. E.g., Rodriguez by Rodriguez, 672 F Supp. at 1012; Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 576.
96. See Leyva, 125 F.R.D. at 515; Rodriguez by Rodriguez, 672 F Supp. at 1013; Haywood,
109 ER.D. at 576. "The decision as to whether joinder is impracticable is essentially a
subjective determination based on expediency and the inconvenience of trying individual
lawsuits." Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 576-77.
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"Commonality" presents the same problems as "numerosity" and the
courts appear to treat it with the same breadth. 97 Commonality is based
upon "a 'common nucleus of operative facts' regardless of whether 'the
underlying facts fluctuate over the class period and vary as to individual
claimants' "98 Rule 23(a)(2) does not mandate that questions of law or fact
be the same for each member of the class. 99 It suffices that there be but
one common question out of many in order to certify the class."° That
there are factual variations in the individual claims will not deny certifica-
tion.' In fact, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Michigan has gone so far as to propose that "common issues of law con-
cerning the legality of defendant practices with respect to [the Act] ...
overrides any factual differences which may exist among class members
with respect to those claims."'0 2
In addressing the "typicality" issue, several courts maintain that a
member's claim is typical if it originates from the "same event or course
of conduct" as that of the claims of the other members "and is based on
the same legal theory."' 3 It is only necessary that the party have an interest
in "prevailing on similar legal claims."' °' Given this interest, typicality ex-
ists regardless of whether there are factual differences, for example, in the
amount of damages claimed between the party and the other members of
the class.' It is enough that there is a substantial similarity of legal theory,
because the requirement focuses on whether the interest of one party is
aligned with that of the class." 6
The final prerequisite is "adequacy of representation.""' 7 The courts
focus on two factors in determining whether adequate representation ex-
ists. ' The first factor concerns the qualifications and skill of counsel and
the second considers the "interest and involvement" of the plaintiffs. 0 9 In
97. See Leyva, 125 ER.D. at 516-17; Rodriguez by Rodriguez, 672 F Supp. at 1015;
Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 577.
98. Haywood, 109 ER..D. at 577.
99. See Leyva, 125 FR.D. at 514; Rodriguez by Rodriguez, 672 E Supp. at 1015; Haywood,
109 FR.D. at 577.
100. Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 577.
101. Id.
102. Rodriguez by Rodriguez, 672 F Supp. at 1015.




107. FED. R. CIv. P 23(a)(4).
108. Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 578.
109. Id. at 578-79.
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addition to the aforementioned prerequisites, the Rule also requires the
presence of at least one of four fairness issues. '
Of the four possibilities, two are of particular concern."' Courts have
looked to whether the questions presented for class determination "pre-
dominate over individual questions" and whether treating the parties as a
class would be "superior to other procedures available for handling the
claims."" 2
In Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Association,' 13 the Fifth
Circuit noted that the district court having originally denied certification,
upon realizing the broad scope and size of the litigants involved, con-
cocted an elaborate scheme that allowed consideration of plaintiffs'
damages as a whole."4 Initially, the district court had denied the certifica-
tion on grounds that "(1) common questions of law and fact did not
predominate because the plaintiffs' claims varied with the employment
conditions each faced; and (2) a class action was not necessarily the supe-
rior method for handling the controversy."' Then, realizing that each of
the hundreds of plaintiffs, few of whom spoke English, would have to tes-
tify as to his or her actual injuries, the court agreed with the plaintiffs'
suggestion that it consider liquidated damages in lieu of actual damages. 116
The court also permitted one representative chosen from the group to
testify to the extent necessary for it to be able to determine the condi-
tions of employment common to the group." 7 In essence, the court
treated the action as if it were a class action justified under the "superior-
ity" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for purposes of determining damages."' The Fifth Circuit found that the
court had not abused its discretion in initially denying certification of the
class because district courts have broad discretion in doing so."' From the
opposite perspective, the Circuit court also held out the possibility that a
110. FED. R. Civ. P 23(b).The court must consider four factors in determining what is
"fair and efficient." Id. It must consider the "interest of the members of the class in indi-
vidually controlling" their positions, "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced" whether it is "desirable" to "concentrate the litiga-
tion [in] the particular forum" and, generally, the overall manageability of the class action.
Id.
111. Id.
112. E.g., PresidioValley Farmers Ass'n v. Brock, 765 F.2d 1353, 1356 (5th Cir. 1985).
113. 765 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 1348.
115. Id. at 1350.
116. Id. at 1348.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1350.
119. Id.
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previously denied certification may subsequently be granted, if the district
court should find that conditions warrant it.'20
Of the four requirements for "superiority," the fourth, "manageabil-
ity" stands out as the most important.'2' There are many tools such as
bifurcation of issues and subclassification that are available to facilitate the
management of a class action.'22 In 1990, the Ninth Circuit found that to
satisfy the Act's objectives of enforcement and deterrence, "the class action
may be the 'superior' and only viable method."' 23 If it facilitates the man-
agement of the class action, it is at the court's discretion to use tools such
as converting an actual damage claim to one of liquid damages and adopt-
ing a cy-pres'24 procedure for distributing them.'25 The result is that the
courts do not need to demand proof of injury from each member of the
class.'2 6
Courts have also taken a pragmatic approach in analyzing "the basic
elements of all civil claims."' 27 These "common elements" include, (1) vio-
lation of the law, (2) fact of injury, and (3) damages. 2 Many courts focus
on the "efficiency of class treatment, the significance of common ques-
tions and whether class certification would result in the serious distortion
of the lawsuit."'29 Common questions need only represent a "significant
aspect of the case" to justify its certification. 3 '
120. Id. at 1350-51. The Fifth Circuit, in Presidio Valley, a sequel case to Salazar,
disregarded its previous deference to changing a denial for certification when warranted
and found that dissimilar conditions of employment failed to meet the "predominant
question" test. Id. at 1356.
121. See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.
1990); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 E2d 225, 233 (7th Cir. 1983); Rodri-
guez by Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672 E Supp. 1009, 1015 (WD. Mich. 1987);
Haywood v. Barnes, 109 ER.D. 568,593 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
122. E.g., Rodriguez by Rodriguez, 672 F Supp. at 1012; Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 593.
123. Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1306 (citing CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AN-D PROCEDURE § 1780 at 584 (1986)).
124. The cy-pres rule is defined as a rule for the construction of instruments in equity,
by which the intention of the party is carried out as near as may be, when it would be im-
possible or illegal to give it literal effect. Thus, where a testator attempts to create a
perpetuity, the court will endeavor, instead of making the devise entirely void, to explain
the will in such a way as to carry out the testator's general intention as far as the rule
against perpetuities will allow. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387 (6th ed. 1990).
125. Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 E2d at 1305-06.
126. Id. Accord Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F2d 1341, 1351 (5th Cir. 1986)
127. Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 581; Leyva v. Buley, 125 ER.D. 512, 518 (E.D.Wash. 1989).
128. Haywood, 109 ER.D. at 581 n.5.
129. Id. at 581.
130. Id. at 581 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1778 (1972)).
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The question of class certification does not touch upon the question
of whether there is a cause of action.'3 ' The claim must merely appear to
be "more than frivolous or 'insubstantial'" to be considered for class certi-
fication.132 The general tendency in determining class certification for
applications involving a remedial statute such as the Act is to make every
effort to certify. Thereupon, once the plaintiffs are certified as a class, the
court determines whether the parties meet requisite definitions presented
in the Act.
B. Common Law Remedial Application of the Act
1 .Who is a Migrant Worker?
In a recent Texas case, Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc.,' 33 the district
court determined the meaning of the term "migrant worker" with regard
to workers who had been recruited in Texas to perform various opera-
tions in an Ohio chicken processing plant.134 The district court traced the
roots of the definition from the FLCRA of 1963, which depended upon
the FLSA for its definition of "agriculture" '35 through its subsequent
amendment in 1974 intending to broaden the Act's coverage 3 6 and finally
to the present Act that incorporates its predecessor's definitions. 137 The
district court confirmed that "agricultural activity" is a broad term en-
compassing poultry processing as well a number of other activities not
necessarily associated with a red barn but that do, nevertheless, meet the
"plain meaning of 'agriculture'" as defined by Webster.138 The Castillo
court concluded that poultry activities are covered under the definition of
"agriculture" because the Act maintained the same protective provisions as
the FLCRA, which in turn defined "agriculture" pursuant to § 204 of the
131. Rodriguez by Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672 F Supp. 1009, 1017
(WD. Mich. 1987).
132. Id. at 1017-18.
133. 48 F Supp. 2d 670 (W.D.Tex. 1999).
134. Id. at 675 n.7.
135. Id. (stating that the term "Agriculture" was defined by reference to 29 U.S.C.
§ 203() and 26 U.S.C. § 3121(4)(A)).
136. Id. (explaining that the 1974 amendment of the FLCRA expanded the scope of
agricultural employment to include "the handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging,
processing, freezing, or grading prior to delivery for storage of an agricultural or horticul-
tural commodity in its unmanufactured state." 7 U.S.C. 5 2042(d) (repealed)).
137. Id. at 676.
138. Id. at 676 n.8 (citation omitted). Accord Rodriguez v.Jackson, 1988WL 150697 at
*1 (D.Ariz. 1988).
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FLSA and § 31 2 1(g) of the IRC, both of which "include reference to
production of poultry."'39
To satisfy the "migrant" delimiter, the court evaluated the "tempo-
rary nature" of the work under an "economic reality" filter.4 ' The court
asserted that the employment relationships between grower, worker and
contractor had become very complicated.' 41 Thus, objective economic
factors (such as turnover, variation in labor demand, and fluctuations in
crop harvesting) should determine the nature of the work, which in turn
would determine the temporary nature of the workers.'42 The Castillo
court announced that, due to the remedial and protective nature of the
Act, the courts should apply a broad interpretation of the term "migrant"
and consider the "economic reality, not contractual levels, nor isolated
facts ... [to] determine employment."'" The fact that plaintiffs could have,
and in some cases, did work all year-round "does not necessarily preclude
[their] qualification as 'migrant' employees."'
4
In Rodriguez v.Jackson,14 meanwhile, the Federal District Court for
the District of Arizona held that, although it was not mandatory that
plaintiffs live at the worksite, the fact that the site was located in a remote
area and a significant distance from plaintiffs' homes satisfied the migra-
tory requirement. 46 They were, the court said, by definition "migrant
workers," because, "as a practical matter, the plaintiffs would have been
unable to commute from their permanent homes to the job site."' 47 The
Ninth Circuit went so far as to say that the definition of "migrant worker"
was a "term of art, having no reference to workers with migratory ten-
139. Castillo, 48 E Supp. 2d at 675 n.7. The court did not stop here in justifying its
conviction that the definition of "agriculture" was broad and included "poultry activities.'
Rather it threw the proverbial book at the term. It stated in footnote eight that:
Even absent such statutory language, the plain meaning of "agriculture"
would encompass poultry farming. "Agriculture" is defined by Webster's
New World Dictionary of the American Language, 29 (1960), as "[t]the
science and art of farming; work of cultivating the soil, producing crops,
and raising livestock." And, as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has stated in reference to the [Act], "agriculture describes a
broad activity ..."
Id. ai 675 n.8 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 679 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-885 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4547,4553).
141. Id. at 678.
142. Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 678 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-885 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4547,4553).
144. Id. at 677. See Soto v. McLean, 20 F Supp.2d 901,907 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
145. No. 85-2492 PHXWPC, 1988WL 150697 (D.Ariz. 1988).
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id. (citation omitted).
[VOL. 7:195
FALL 2001] A Balanced Remedy
dencies"'"4 The court held that the legislative intent in drafting the Act
was to "cover those excluded from the Fair Labor Standards Act."'
149
2.What Constitutes Employment?
After the court decides that the party or parties are "migrant" labor-
ers employed in an agricultural activity, it looks to the issue
of employment. The court must evaluate the relationship between the
migrant and the party directing the work.'5 0 The court determines
whether the employer is the farmer, the farm labor contractor,'5 ' or
both.12 In the case of corporations, the court must also decide whether
the corporate entity or its officers are liable.' 3 Finally, although the defen-
dant qualifies as an employer, [s]he may be exempt.' 4
The Act requires that the worker be "employed."' ss As recent as 1999,
the Eleventh Circuit, in Charles v. Burton, asserted that it was Congress's
intent to reject the common-law definition of employment, which is
based upon limiting concepts of control and supervision."6 If a person or
entity "suffers or permits" individuals to work, they employ that individ-
ual."' The court further clarified that "[a]n entity 'suffers or permits' an
individual to work if, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is de-
pendent on the entity."' 8 In cases where more than one potential
employer exists, the question is whether each has sufficient control over
148. Marshall v. Coastal Growers Ass'n, 598 F2d 521,524 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. Id. (citing Hearings on H.R. 14254. Before the Subcommittee on Agricultural
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong. 123 (1976)).
150. See Charles v. Burton, 169 F3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999);Torres-Lopez v. May,
111 F3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1997); Elizondo v. Podgorniak, 70 F Supp. 2d 758, 761 (E.D.
Mich. 1999);Alviso-Medrano v. Harloff, 868 F Supp. 1367, 1371-1374 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
151. See Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F2d 1275, 1278-1280 (5th Cir. 1985)
(referring to the MSAWPA to interpret its predecessor, the FLCRA); Donovan v. Heringer
Ranches, Inc., 650 F2d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 1981); Soliz v. Plunkett, 615 F2d 272, 274
(5th Cit. 1980); Rodriguez by Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672 F Supp. 1009,
1018 (WD. Mich. 1987) (explaining that agricultural employers are not within the defini-
tion of labor contractors).
152. E.g., Charles, 169 F.3d at 1328; Torres-Lopez, 111 F3d at 639-41, 644); Ricketts v.
Vann, 32 F.3d 71,74 (9th Cit. 1994); Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F2d 1341 (5th Cit. 1986).
153. See, e.g., De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983);
Donovan, 650 E2d at 1153.
154. See Flores v. Rios, 36 F3d 507 (6th Cir. 1994); Calderon v.Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101,
1105 (7th Cit. 1993).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A).
156. Charles, 169 F3d at 1328 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (citation omitted). Accord An-
tenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F3d 925,929 (11th Cit. 1996) (citation omitted).
157. Charles, 169 F3d at 1328.
158. Id. (citation omitted).
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the worker to qualify as an employer.'- 9 The issue is not one of a compari-
son of the worker's economic dependence on the farmer with the
worker's dependence on the independent contractor, whereby the party
upon whom there is the least dependence may avoid the responsibilities
of an employer. 160 "Joint employment" is the term that describes this rela-
tionship161 and it is precisely the recognition of such a relationship that
compelled Congress to replace the FLCRA with the Act.
1 62
Articulating the result of many years of development by the courts,
the Burton court offered what it considered to be the "regulatory factors
as guidance in determining economic dependence, and ultimately,
whether an employment relationship exists. '163 "The joint employment
doctrine is a 'central foundation' of the [Act] and the 'indivisible hinge
between certain important duties imposed for the protection of migrant
and seasonal workers and those liable for any breach of those duties.'" '6'
According to the Burton court, there are seven factors, no one of which is
dispositive, that should be taken into account in finding a "joint employ-
ment" relationship. 65 The list essentially emphasizes the importance of the
degree of control that the parties exercise over the workers.1
66
Just as no one factor is determinative, they also are not cumulative.161




162. Ross, supra note 43, at 274.
163. Charles, 169 F3d at 1328-29 (citation omitted).
164. Saintida v.Tyre, 783 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
97-885 at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4552).
165. See Charles, 169 F3d at 1328-29. This list of factors includes: whether the em-
ployer has the power singly "or through the FLC, to direct, control, or supervise the
workers or the work performed;" whether the employer could "hire or fire, modify the
employment conditions, or determine pay rates;""the degree of permanency and duration
of the relationship of the parties" with regard to the agricultural activity; the skills required
to do the job; whether the job was "an integral part of the overall business;" whether the
job was done on the employer's property or at least an area that the employer fully con-
trols; and whether the employer performs the administrative tasks usually born by
employers, such as preparing and maintaining records and making required government
payments, i.e., FICA taxes, workers' compensation, etc. Id. at 1329.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 1333-34. See also Aimable v. Long and Scott Farms, 20 E3d 434, 439
(11th Cir. 1994). Aimable actually listed eleven factors.The first five factors were classified
as "regulatory factors" set out by the Secretary of Labor in 29 C.ER. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)
(1992) to be used as guidance in the definition of"joint employment." Aimable, 20 F3d. at
440. They are: nature and degree of control; degree of supervision, direct or indirect; power
to determine pay rates or method of payment; right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or
modify the employment conditions; and "preparation of payroll and payment of wages." Id.
at 440-42. Two more factors are considered in the definition: ownership of property or
facilities where work occurs and "performance of a specialty job within the production
line integral to the business." Id. at 439, 444. The final four factors are to be considered
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workers were actually independent contractors.16 "Inherent in this expan-
sive interpretation is the intent ... that the terms 'employee:'employer" and
'independent contractor' not be construed in their limiting common law
sense."169 In light of this broad interpretation, a court may look to the indi-
vidual circumstances of a case and place liability on the proper shoulders.
3. Determining Liability
The courts have looked beyond formalities and considered the real-
ity of the circumstances when deciding whether a worker or farm labor
contractor is an independent contractor."' In Elizondo v. Podgorniak,17 1 the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered
the defense that pickle harvesters were independent contractors."7 2 The
employer argued that the pickle harvesters signed contracts whereby they
would buy the crop for twenty-percent of its worth. One condition of the
contract was that the pickle harvesters use the services of the employer.
1 7 3
The court held that it was necessary to look at the "totality of circum-
stances [to] show [that] Plaintiffi were workers and the contract was a
sham." 174 The defendants had paid the workers to hoe the crops that they
allegedly had purchased and then paid the workers for the number of
pickles they had tagged.17 1 Finally, the defendants would control the
amount of payment to insure that it equaled the minimum wage. 176 These
only when determining the definition of "independent contractor." Id. at 443-44. They
are: investment in capital assets; opportunity for control of profit and loss; "permanency
and exclusivity of employment;" and the amount of skill necessary to do the job. Id. at
439,443-44.
168. E.g., Elizondo v. Podgorniak, 70 F Supp. 2d 758, 767 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Soto v.
McLean, 20 F Supp. 2d 901,916 (E.D.N.C. 1998);Alviso-Medrano v. Harloff, 868 F Supp.
1367,1372-74 (M.D. Fla. 1994); but see Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F2d 1114,1120 (6th Cir.
1984) (using similar criteria to establish that pickle harvesters were independent contrac-
tors) and Charles v. Burton 857 F Supp. 1574 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (distinguishing certain
factors required for determining independent contractor status from those for "joint em-
ployment").
169. Saintida v.Tyre, 783 F Supp. 1368, 1373 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
170. Elizondo, 70 F Supp. 2d at 767. Accord, e.g., Alviso-Medrano, 868 F Supp. 1367 (find-
ing that two non-regulatory and two regulatory factors in favor of the plaintiffs were
sufficient to find that defendant was an "employer"); Cavazos v. Foster, 822 F Supp. 438,
441 (WD. Mich. 1993).
171. 70 F Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
172. Id. at 762.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 773.The court reviewed the pertinent factors for determining employment
status with respect to all four cases. Id. at 767.Without expressly rejecting Brandel the court
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facts belied the validity of the contract and pointed to an employer-
employee relationship."'
Moreover, in Haywood v. Barnes,"18 keeping sight of the protective
purpose of the Act, a North Carolina district court went as far as to say
that "even in the event the farm labor contractors were independent
contractors, [it] could still conclude [that the] defendants were joint
employers of the plaintiffs."'"1 9 Nor does the terrain vary much when
corporations are involved.'8° A corporation that acts as a recruiting house
for a group of farmers will not be able to claim an exemption because it
does not directly employ the workers and does not receive a fee for
finding them.18 ' The courts reserve the right to examine the nature of
membership dues and the executive make-up to determine whether the
corporation controls or intends to control employment.'8 '
The remedial nature of the Act necessitates a broad expansion of all
definitions to protect the migrant agricultural worker, even if it means pierc-
ing the corporate veil.'8' In Rodriguez v Carlson, the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington held that the question of "control"
was dispositive in determining corporate liability for violations of the Act.'"
The fact that a corporation is the employer "does not preclude a finding that
individual officers, agents, or employees also exercised "control" over the
property and should be held accountable for compliance with health and
safety standards."' 8 The court considered the corporate officers or agents to
be joint employers and subject to the obligations under the Act. 86
Likewise, the fact that an association that recruits and hires migrant ag-
ricultural workers has the status of a nonprofit organization does not
exempt it from being a farm labor contractor pursuant to the Act. 87 That a
company does not reap a profit does not mean it is not paid a "fee" for re-
cruitment purposes. ' Any form of consideration constitutes a fee under
the Act.'89 The dues of the individual members of the organization served as
177. Id.
178. 109 FR.D. 568 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
179. Id. at 585.
180. E.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 E2d 1301 (9th Cit.
1990).
181. See De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 234-35 (7th Cir.
1983).
182. See id. at 235-36.
183. See Rodriguez v. Carlson, 943 E Supp. 1263, 1267 (E.D.Wash. 1996).
184. Id. (citation omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1268.
187. Marshall v. Coastal Growers Ass'n, 598 E2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1979).
188. Id. at 523-24.
189. Id. at 524 (citing 7 U.S.C. 5 2042(c)).
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the fee received to recruit and hire migrant workers, therefore, qualifying
the association as a farm labor contractor. 190
Conversely, corporations, as legal persons, are eligible for exemptions
for the same reasons as individuals.' 9' In Marshall v. Green Goddess Avocado
Corp.,19 2 the court reasoned that since the corporation was a legal person,
when it used its employees to contract migrant farm laborers it was doing
so "personally" and consequently met the exemption requirement of the
Act. 193 Since Marshall, with an occasional exception,' 94 the courts have ap-
peared to tighten the scope of exemptions.195
4. Exemptions
The two most commonly invoked exemptions are the "family busi-
ness exemption"' 196 and the "small business exemption."' 97 In 1994, the
Sixth Circuit, in Flores v. Rios,'"8 established a "two-step analysis" when
examining a family business exemption defense. 99 First, courts must
"identify" the type of labor contracting activities being conducted. Sec-
ond, courts must conclude that the activities were being "performed
exclusively by members of the farmer's family."20 The Flores court main-
tained that "any" contracting endeavors on the part of a "non-family
member spoils" enjoyment of the exemption. 21 1 The court held that the
lack of "any direct contact between the employer and migrant worker"
waived the exemption.20 2 Word of mouth qualifies as recruitment and can
act to negate family status.20 3 The court did, however, find that the Act did
190. Id. Some courts have refused to find individual members of an association jointly
liable. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass'n v. Brock, 765 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5th Cir. 1985). These
decisions, however, precede the Act, which holds the FLC and growers jointly liable. Ross,
supra note 43, at 274.
191. E.g., Marshall v. Green Goddess Avocado Corp., 615 F2d 851 (9th Cir. 1980);
Usery v. Paramount Citrus Ass'n, Inc., 475 F Supp. 700,703-04 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
192. 615 F2d 851 (9th Cir. 1980).
193. Id. at 855 (citing FLCRA § 2042(b)). Realizing the potential for abuse, however, the
court cautioned that the contracting employees must be "regular" or "full-time" employees
engaged on an "incidental basis" in contracting only for their employer. Id.
194. Lopez v. Bruegel, 563 F Supp. 316,318 (N.D.Tex. 1983).
195. E.g., Flores v. Rios, 36 E3d 507, 510 (6th Cir. 1994); Calderon v.Witvoet, 999 F.2d
1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993).
196. 29 U.S.C.§ 1803(a)(1).
197. 29 U.S.C.§ 1803(a)(2).
198. 36 F3d 507 (6th Cir. 1994).
199. Idat 510.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 516.
203. Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc., 96 F Supp. 2d 578,599 (WD.Tex. 1999) (ci-
tation omitted); see also Montelongo v. Meese, 803 E2d 1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1986).
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not intend to deprive a family farmer of the benefit of using the local
bureau of employment services."° It offered that "the government's pres-
ence in the labor market can only serve to protect workers" and thus
better serve the remedial intent of the Act.2"'
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in 1993, the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Michigan, in Martinez v Hauch , held that farmers
who got referrals from the Employment Security Commission Job Service
lost exemption status.0 7 The court did so on the grounds that the "Job
Service forms and documents refer to the agency's activity as 'recruiting"208
and in light of the Congressional intent to construe such exemptions
narrowly, one must look to the "plain meaning" of the terms involved.
20 9
The "small business exemption" applies to "[a]ny person, other than a
farm labor contractor" who did not use more than five hundred man-days
of agricultural labor in any quarter of the previous year.21" The burden of
verifying the man-days worked is on the defendant. 21 This provision man-
dates that the farm grower maintain accurate documented records of hours
worked, number of employers, employee attendance, and payroll figures.
212
Without this data, the court will presume that the exemption does not ap-
ply.213 If the defendant falls within the definition of employer and does not
qualify for an exemption, he bears the burden of showing that he did not
violate the provisions of the Act as alleged by the migrant workers. 2 '4 The
most common claims deal with violations of the wage, 25 housing,216 trans-
portation,217 and documentation or recording' provisions of the Act.
204. Flores, 36 F3d at 513.
205. Id.
206. 838 F Supp. 1209 (WD. Mich. 1993).
207. Id. at 1214.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1213.
210. 29 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(A)).
211. Charles v. Burton., 857 F Supp. 1574, 1582 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (citing Donovan v.Wil-
hams Chem. Co., 682 F2d 185,191 (8th Cir. 1982)).
212. See id. at 1582-83.
213. See id.
214. See Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 E2d 1500, 1513-1514 (11th Cir.
1993).Although technically the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proof, when one considers
the remedial purpose of the act that burden is significantly lightened.
215. See, e.g.,Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 E3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996); Calderon v.Witvoet,
999 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1993); Donaldson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 930 F2d 339 (4th Cir. 1991).
216. E.g., Flores v. Rios, 36 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1994); Caro-Galvan, 993 F.2d at 1502-03;
Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1990);
Bracamontes v.Weyerhaeuser Co., 840 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1988).
217. E.g., Adams Fruit Co., Inc., v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990); Charles v. Burton, 169
F3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999); Ricketts v.Vann, 32 F.3d 71 (4th Cir. 1994).





A right to a private cause of action to recover actual or statutory
damages exists if the violation of the Act was "intentional." '19 The courts
interpret the term "intentional" such that a violator will be held liable for
the natural consequences of his or her acts.2 0 The term is construed "to
further the Act's remedial purposes. 22'1 Therefore, there need not be spe-
cific intent to violate the law.22  Furthermore, that the defendant lacked
knowledge of the Act does not preclude that he acted intentionally
23
Whether a defendant "intentionally" violated the Act is to be determined
by the trier-of-fact.
224
If the trier-of-fact finds an intentional violation of the Act, it may
award either full actual damages, statutory damages up to $ 500 per viola-
tion, 221 or "other equitable relief."226 Courts have held that the Act does
not require "proof of actual injury" to qualify for an award of liquidated
damages. 2 7 The statutory award may be considered as a deterrent to fur-
ther abusive practices in the migrant farm labor market.28 Previously
awarded compensation for back wages does not bar an award of damages
under the Act. 29 The court alone has the discretion of the amount of
statutory damages to award.23° In 1993, for example, the Ninth Circuit, in
Martinez v. Shinn,231 laid out seven considerations when fixing damages
that considered the size of awards and degree of liability.23 2 The same court
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1).
220. See, e.g., Bueno v. Mattner, 829 F2d 1380, 1386 (6th Cir. 1987); accord Salazar-
Calderon v. PresidioValley Farmers Ass'n, 765 F2d 1334, 1345 (5th Cir. 1985).
221. Bueno, 829 F2d at 1386 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 1385-86 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 1385.
224. Escobar v. Baker, 814 F. Supp. 1491,1507 (WD.Wash. 1993).
225. It should be noted that, early interpretations of the FLCR.A appear to misread the
statutory provision as mandating an award of no less than $500 per violation. See, e.g.,
Espinoza v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 641 F2d 535, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled by
Alvarez v.Joan ofArc, Inc., 658 F2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1981); Guerrero v. Garza, 464 F
Supp. 509,510 (WD.Wis. 1978).
226. 29 U.S.C. 5 1854(c)(1).
227. Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F2d 1301, 1306 ( 9th Cir.
1990). See also Haywood v. Barnes, 109 ER.D. 568,584 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
228. Frederick County Fruit Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Dole, 709 F Supp. 242, 248 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)
229. Id.
230. Stewart v. Everett, 804 F Supp. 1494, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
231. 992 F2d 997 (9th Cir. 1993).
232. Id. at 999.The court itemized the following considerations: "the amount of award
to each plaintiff" the entire award; the nature and frequency of the violations and whether
they were "substantive or technical;" the degree of guilt to be assigned to the defendant;
damages awarded in similar cases; the "defendants' ability to prevent future violations;" and
the particular circumstances of the case at hand. Id. See also Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio,
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held that it was free to award both actual damages for some violations and
statutory damages for others. 233 The thrust in awarding damages for viola-
tions of the Act is the same as it is throughout the entire Act. Its purpose
is at once remedial and deterrent.
In consideration of the foregoing interpretations of the Act, a court
that does not apply the provisions of the Act liberally must be viewed as
an anomaly. From the cases reviewed, there are very few courts that have
chosen to burden the migrant worker with formalities and strict statutory
readings. It is in this context that we review the recent decisions of the
Federal District Court for the District of Maine.
V. A LOST CAUSE: STATES MISAPPLYING MSAWPA &
THE EXAMPLE OF MAINE
The State of Maine is four percent the size of California234 but its
problems with respect to migrant workers are, in many ways, more com-
plicated. As recently as 1998, Benjamin Giuliani, executive director of the
Maine Migrant Workers' Advocate Group, Inc. and founder of the Federa-
tion of the Mexican Community in New England, editorialized that the
Maine state legislature and political body in general continue to ignore
the working conditions of the migrant workers. 23- It can be easily over-
looked in a state whose population barely exceeds one and one quarter
million people, that much of its industry from potatoes, raspberry farms,
"blueberry barrens, broccoli fields, and apple orchards" to commercial
forestry, depends upon migrant workers.236 As in many states, out-of-state
contractors bring these workers into Maine.2 37 A desire to earn a wage
undreamed of in their homeland, transience and oftentimes inability to
speak English place these workers at the mercy of their contractors."3
Consequently, claims of abuses such as inadequate transportation, housing,
Inc., 96 F Supp. 2d 578, 630-31 (WD.Tex. 1999); Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F2d 1341,
1350 (5th Cir. 1986); Stewart, 804 F Supp. at 1499; Saintida v.Tyre, 783 E Supp. 1368, 1373
(S.D. Fla. 1992).
233. Martinez, 992 F2d at, 1001. See also Saintida, 783 F Supp. at 1377.
234. Haya El Nasser, Immigration to Lead Population Boom in West Census Predicts
Calif. Will Grow 56% by 2025, USA TODAY, October 23, 1996, at 7A (exhibiting a com-
puter analysis of U.S. Census Bureau by Paul Overberg).
235. Benjamin Giuliani, Editorial, Farm Worker Safety Not Getting Comprehensive Atten-
tion It Deserves, PORTLAND PREss HERALD, July 30, 1998, at 11A (complaining that the
"hand rake" is still widely used in the blueberry fields of Maine, years after C~sar Chivez,
by applying political pressure, had the "brazo del diablo" or short hoe banned in Califor-
nia).
236. See Tux Turkel, Work in Maines Woods Lures Wave of Migrants for Central American
Recruits, The Difficult Job of Planting and Thinning Trees Here Means Both Opportunity and Risks,





and health care have been progressively making their way to the courts.2 39
At first, these claims were received under a broad interpretation of the
remedial intent of the statute in question.
240
A. Background: Maine's Mood
In 1980, Richard Clark, a forty-three year old foreman of the sheep
and cattle farm of DeCoster Egg Farms was butted by a ram and thrown
to the ground breaking two teeth and injuring his back.241 Clark filed an
accident report describing the accident, but failed to specify any back
pain.242 Clark subsequently went to Florida where he was treated for back
pain and filed for workmens' compensation benefits citing the incident at
DeCoster's as the cause.243 DeCoster requested that benefits for Clark's
back pain be denied on grounds that he had not given DeCoster notice
of such pain as required by Maine law.2" The Workmens' Compensation
Commission denied the claim for back injury and Clark filed an action in
the Maine Superior Court and lost.24 Clark then appealed to the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court. 2 6 Justice Godfrey, interpreting the workmens'
compensation requirements liberally, sustained the appeal on grounds that,
at most, the "lack of specification of a back injury in his description ...
239. See id.; see also, e.g., Maine. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 770 F2d 236 (1st Cir. 1985) (sus-
taining the DOL's decision not to award a grant to provide job training for migrant and
seasonal workers to the highest scoring applicant on grounds that other factors had to be
considered); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 ER.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000) (denying that a group of
migrant workers qualified under the MSAWPA as agricultural workers and failed to satisfy
the elements of a class action); Cortes v. Superior Forestry Serv., Inc., No. Civ. 99-CV-19-
B, 2000 WL 760741 (D. Me. March 15, 2000) (finding that workers killed while traveling in
a van supplied by their contractor for all necessary transportation and which was used for
their transportation from Arkansas to Maine did not fall under the "ride sharing" excep-
tion to the state's Workmen's Compensation Act); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster,
69 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Me. 1999) (applying the State six-year statute of limitations in cases
involving health and safety violations in lieu of the federal statute six-month statute under
OSHA); Sec'y of Labor v. DeCoster Egg Farms, Inc., No. 80-0134 P, 1982WL 2165 *1 (D.
Me. Feb 23, 1982) (stating that it is the employer's burden to produce records in "useable
form" as required by FLSA); State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891 (Me. 1995) (holding that the
relationship between the employer and employee was one of a landlord/tenant even
though the employees did not pay a rent and that employer was liable for purpose of the
Civil Rights Act).
240. See, e.g., DeCoster Egg Farms, Inc., No. 80-0134 P, 1982 WL 2165 *1; DeCoster, 653
A.2d 891; Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms and U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 421 A.2d 939 (Me.
1980).
241. Clark, 421 A.2d at 940.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 941.
244. Id. at 941 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, 5 63 (West 1978)).
245. Id. at 941.
246. Id. at 941.
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should be characterized as an 'inaccuracy'... [and consequently] his writ-
ten notice ... was not invalid....-47
The Clark case, although not arising from a violation of the Act, ex-
emplifies the extent to which Maine state courts would expand statutory
interpretation when applying a remedial measure. Such interpretation
generally will set the mood for both federal and state agencies charged
with policing activity governed by remedial statutes and the state of
Maine has been no exception.24 Nevertheless, despite the apparent
aggressive efforts on the part of the state of Maine to broaden the net of
protection, the district court has significantly narrowed its interpretation
of the available remedial statutes.
Unlike the example set by Justice Godfrey in the Clark case and the
subsequent actions of state agencies, where there is a question whether
the Act applies, the Federal District Court for the District of Maine has
chosen to read the terms of the Act narrowly."9 The most recent case, Ra-
mirez v. DeCoster,s° offers a clear example of a reluctance on the part of
Maine's federal district court to broaden its application of legal procedure
and its definition of statutory terms when administering the law in cases
involving migrant worker abuses.
247. Id.
248. In the last quarter century, federal and state agencies have also made obvious ef-
forts to redress these abuses. In 1980, the U.S. DOL fined DeCoster for employing child
labor and not paying overtime premium to approximately six hundred and fifty employees.
DeCoster Fined Millions a Federal Investigation Finds Dangerous and Oppressive Conditions at
the Egg Farm in Turner, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 13, 1996, at 1A. Then, in June of
1988, DeCoster was fined $46,250 for 184 violations "including knowingly hiring illegal
aliens." Id. Later the same year, former employees charged that they were forced to live in
substandard housing and forced to work overtime without compensation. Id. The next
year, federal officials fined DeCoster for "knowingly employing and continuing to employ
unauthorized workers." Id. In 1994, the Catholic Diocese of Maine charged that DeCoster
interfered with its Hispanic workers' freedom to worship. Id. The following year, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the company violated its workers' civil rights by refus-
ing to allow visitors to meet with them in company-owned housing. State v. DeCoster,
653 A.2d 891, 892 (Me. 1995) (affirming a 1991 Superior Court ruling). The year 1996
brought several inspections by State officials and legislators who found substandard living
conditions and fire hazards. DeCoster Fined, supra, at 1A. On July 12, 1996, the federal Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration fined DeCoster $3.6 million dollars for what
Labor Secretary, Robert Reich called "conditions ... as dangerous and oppressive as any
sweatshop we have seen." Id.
249. E.g., Cortes v. Superior Forestry Serv., Inc., No. CIV 99-CV-19-B, 2000 WL
760741 (D. Me. March 15, 2000); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 ER.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000); but
see ME Cherryfield Firm to Pay $10,000 Fine, Migrant Blueberry Rakers Were Victims of Federal
Labor Law Violation During 1998 Harvest, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, available at 1999 WL
19808529 (reporting that the U.S. Department of Labor found Cheeryfield Foods jointly
liable with FLC American Forestry for violations of MSAWPA).
250. 194 ER.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000).
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B. Ramirez v. DeCoster
In Ramirez v. DeCoster, DeCoster employees complained their em-
ployer "engaged in an overall pattern ... of discrimination against workers
of Mexican descent;" violated their rights under the Act with regard to
both unsafe and unsanitary housing, as well as providing misleading in-
formation in the terms and conditions of employment; and breached their
contract to provide free housing.2 t The plaintiffs moved for certification
of their class with respect to all three claims. 2 DeCoster moved for sum-
mary judgment on all counts."3 Judge Hornby granted summary
judgment on all but one count, individual charges of racial discrimina-
tion.211 Relying upon the Advisory Committee Notes for the rule
governing class action suits, the court determined that the workers' choice
to seek compensatory and punitive damages in lieu of the equitable rem-
edy of back pay precluded their representation as a class with regard to
their discrimination claim.
255
The court also reasoned that the request that DeCoster be enjoined
from continuing its discriminatory practices was an insufficient remedy
for those who had left its employment. 25 6 Furthermore, because the plain-
tiffs may have been affected in "substantially different ways depending on
such factors as the length and dates of employment, the type of employ-
ment, who his/her supervisor was, and the specific housing the worker
lived in'" they could not be certified as a single class. 2 7 In addition, the




Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and breach of contract failed to meet the
commonality and typicality requirements of the rule for certification of a
class action.259 The court insisted that such claims were by their nature
251. Id. at 351-52.
252. Id. at 351.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 352. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), which requires that "the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole" and its Advisory Committee notes state that Rule 23 (b)(2) "does
not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predomi-
nantly to money damages.")
256. Id.
257. Id. at 352-53 (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 353 (referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) that requires that "questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to all other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
259. Id. at 355.
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"fact-specific to each individual."'26 In addition, the court, by granting
summary judgment to each claim, in essence disqualified those individuals
as "proper representatives ... if [a class] were to be certified."
261
Finally, in a double whammy statement, the court first concluded
that "processing eggs is ineligible for protection" under the Act and
consequently rendered any class action regarding its violation moot.
2 62
Judge Hornby also found the workers to be neither migrant nor seasonal
agricultural workers pursuant to the Act.263 In a confusing analysis, the
court first assumed egg processing to be an agricultural function and the
workers to be "absent overnight from [their] permanent place of
residence" 261 two basic requirements of the Act.
265
The court then proceeded to analyze the nature of "seasonal"
work.26 6 Referring to the definition of "seasonal
267 and "temporary" 26
provided by the Federal Labor Regulations and adopted by the Act, the
court found that neither definition covered the workers.269 According to
the court, it is not the intent of the workers or their decision regarding
duration of employment that matters. Instead, the nature of the work itself
determines the applicability of these terms. 20 Apparently disregarding its
previous assumption, the court proceeded to use the Code of Federal
Regulations to deny that egg processing is an agricultural activity because
it does not fall under the definition of "field work."
271
Before leaving the subject of the Act's applicability, Judge Hornby
took a step to the side to comment that he understood what the "average




263. Id. at 356.
264. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §1802(8)(A)).
265. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A) ("Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term 'mi-
grant agricultural worker' means an individual who is employed in agricultural
employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature, and who is required to be absent
overnight frm his permanent place of residence.").
266. Id.
267. 29 C.ER. § 500.20(s)(1) (2000) states that "Labor is performed on a seasonal basis
where, ordinarily, the employment pertains to or is of the kind exclusively perormed at certain
seasons or periods of the year and which, from its nature, may not be continuous or carried on
throughout the year. A worker who moves from one seasonal activity to another, while employed in
agriculture or performing agricultural labor, is employed on a seasonal basis even though he may
continue to be employed during a major portion of the year." Id. (emphasis added).
268. 29 C.FR. § 500.20(s)(2) (2000) states that" [a] worker is employed on 'other tem-
porary basis' where he is employed for a limited time only or his performance is
contemplated for a particular piece of work, usually of short duration. Generally, employ-
ment, which is contemplated to continue indefinitely, is not temporary." Id. (emphasis added).
269. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 356.
270. Id. at 357 n.9.
271. Id. at 357 (citing 29 CER. § 500.20(r)(ii)).
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who come from other countries to work temporarily in a strange land."'
He insisted, however, that it is not his place to speak for these people, that
is the job of Congress. 273 Thus, the court assumed that Congress has cho-
sen to define "migrant worker" contrary to the common sense of the
"average layperson."'2 74 On that point, Judge Hornby said, "the statutory
language is clear and must control"
275
Judge Hornby also insisted that the bulk of case law supports his in-
terpretation with the exception of two cases. 276 However, Judge Hornby
then painfully stretched the Eleventh Circuit Court's broad interpretation
of the statute's intent to fit his own.277 He excused the second case, from
the Western District ofTexas, that applied a broad reading of the statute as
an example of letting one's emotions and sympathy override one's rea-
son. 2 The court, he said, could empathize with such feelings but it could
only give "the protection which Congress has provided' 279 Finally, be-
cause DeCoster's housing was available all year long, it could not qualify as
a short-term lease arrangement. 20 "[A]lthough the result is harsh," the
Judge explained, "Maine law, as it currently exists, does not recognize an
implied warranty [of habitability] here."
' 21
C. Cortes v. Superior Forestry Services, Inc
Two weeks prior to Ramirez, in Cortes v. Superior Forestry Services,
Inc., 2 2 Andreas Soriano Cortes (plaintiff) filed a negligence and wrongful
death claim against a farm labor contractor, Superior Forestry, Inc.
272. Id. Although there may be some merit to the statement that the common concep-
tion of migrant workers is that they are strangers in a strange land working temporarily
and then returning to their respective countries, it is by no means the case.The fact is that
there are many migrant workers who are citizens of the United States, traveling from states
such as Florida, Louisiana etc. to find agricultural work throughout the Union. For a very
stark, if not bleak look at the status of migrant workers in the 1960s see Edward R. Mur-
row's documentary, HARVEST OF SHAME (CBS 1960).
273. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 357.
274. Id.
275. Id. 29 U.S.C. §1802(8)(a) defines "migrant agricultural worker" as "an individual
who is employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature, and
who is required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of residence."
276. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 357 (citing both Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc.,
993 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993) and Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc., 48 F Supp. 2d 670
(WD.Tex. 1999)).
277. Id. (citations omitted).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 358.
280. Id. at 360.
281. Id.
282. No. CIV 99-CV-19-B, 2000 WL 760741, at *1 (D. Me. March 15,2000).
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(Superior).28 3 The plaintiff represented the estate of Lorenzo Soriano
Cortes who was a passenger of Superior's van when it crashed on the way
to work in Aroostook County.284 The Federal District Court for the
District of Maine granted Superior summary judgment on grounds that
plaintiff's claims were barred by the Maine Workers' Compensation Act
(MWCA).285 The decision turned upon the use of the van.286 The court
analyzed the applicability of a "rideshare" provision in the MWCA, which
constituted an exception to workmens' compensation coverage and
§ 1854(d)(1) of the Act. 87 This Section requires that, when available,
"workers' compensation benefits shall be the exclusive remedy for loss ...
in the case of bodily injury or death in accordance with such State's
workers' compensation law."
288
Cortes was a Mexican migrant worker who had signed on with Su-
perior in Tilly, Arkansas to perform "thinning" operations in the Maine
woods.289 The van that was transporting Cortes to work when he was
killed was the same van that brought him from Arkansas.29 It was the
"sole source of transportation" for the workers and Superior bore all the
expenses. 291 The driver of the van was also the crew foreman.29 2 The plain-
tiff also alleged that the driver was traveling at an excessive speed.29 3 At the
time of the crash, the van was carrying fifteen passengers.
294
Judge Brody first dismissed any coverage under the Act pursuant to
its workmens' compensation override clause. 29 He then determined that
although the "rideshare" provision "extended ... [the] limited exception
to the rule of workmens' compensation liability for employer-provided
transportation to and from work" it did not apply when the vehicle also
served as an "all-purpose" van.2 96 His conclusion was based in large part
upon the "Maine Supreme Court's narrow construction" of the rideshare
provision.
297
283. Id. at *1.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at *4.
287. Id. at *2 (citing ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 201(2) (West 2001) and 29 U.S.C.
1854(d)(1) (1999) of the MSAWPA).
288. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(d)(1).





294. Id. at *2.
295. Id.




D. Ramirez and Cortes Through a Common Law Filter
The decisions of both Ramirez and Cortes exemplify a struggle to
understand the intent of the Act and to apply its definitions to the case at
hand. However, an analysis of the Act and its terms cannot be accom-
plished in the vacuum of decisions by the Federal District Court for the
District of Maine. A proper evaluation must include a fair sampling of all
the law issuing from those States of the Union that depend upon migrant
workers and must address their unique problems.
1. Ramirez v. DeCoster
a. Side-Stepping the Remedial Intent of the Act
In Ramirez, the court denied certification of the class for all the
claims of racial discrimination, unsafe and unsanitary housing, and breach
of contract. 28 The court rejected claims of violations of the Act on
grounds that the workers were not "migrant agricultural workers" pursu-
ant to the Act, and consequently were not protected by it.299 It is
important to first address the issue of whether plaintiffs met the definition
of "migrant agricultural worker" before analyzing the court's treatment of
the other claims. As "migrant agricultural workers" they are members of a
protected class. In a series of very skilled judicial moves, however, the
court in essence captured the remedial "queen" by refusing to recognize
the plaintiffs' status as migrant workers and opened the way to mate the
issue of class certification.
Admitting that normally a court would be prone to determine class
certification before studying the merits of the case, the court stated that
for expediency's sake it decided to first address defendant's motion for
summary judgment before determining class certification as to the claims
regarding the Act. 30° In doing so, the court avoided the pressure placed
upon it by the liberal common law application of class certification as a
preferred method for treating alleged violations of the Act. As has been
said, the court first assumed that the "egg processing business" was "agri-
cultural employment."" ' The court also assumed that the workers were
"absent overnight from [their] permanent place of residence."30 2 At this
point the court needed to say no more. The court had defined the work-
ers as "migrant agricultural workers" pursuant to the Act. Nevertheless, it
298. Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 FR.D. 348,351-56 (D. Me. 2000).
299. Id. at 356-58.
300. Id. at 355.
301. Id. at 356.
302. Id.
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then focused on the requirement that the workers be seasonal or tempo-
rary.
303
In emphasizing the "continuous" nature of the work, the court chose
to ignore the second sentence of 29 C.ER. § 500.20(s)(1), which states
that "[a] worker who moves from one seasonal activity to another, while
employed in agriculture or performing agricultural labor, is employed on
a seasonal basis even though he may continue to be employed during a
major portion of the year."34 The court rejected the Castillo court's inter-
pretation that evaluated the "temporary nature" of the work under an
"economic reality" filter.300 The Ramirez court felt that the judge in Casti-
llo let his concern for the workers affect his interpretation of the Act. 36 Yet
in light of the majority of cases considering the remedial nature of the
statute and the need to interpret its provisions liberally, it is the Ramirez
court that got it wrong and let reason mislead it.
In arguing that pragmatic factors such as turnover, variation in labor
demand and fluctuations in crop harvesting determine the nature of the
work, which in turn determines its temporary nature, the Castillo court
echoes the interpretation of many courts. 7 To argue, as the Ramirez court
does, that the definition must be found within a strict reading of the stat-
ute places the burden on the plaintiff and defeats the remedial purpose of
the Act. The Marshal °8 court's insistence that these elements are terms of
art intended to promote the remedial nature of the Act far better serves
the Act's purpose.
In contrast to the ease with which the Ramirez court dismissed Cas-
tillo as an anomaly, the strain it exerted in making Caro-Galvan v. Curtis
Richardson, Inc. fit the mold is excruciating.09 The Caro-Galvan court
steadfastly supported the Marshall "term of art" concept and simply held
that all the facts must be taken into account in determining whether the
work was temporary or seasonal. 1° The point made emphatically in Caro-
Galvan was that it was Congressional intent to preserve the same broad
protections as were originally provided in the FLCRA. 31 Had the Rami-
rez court applied the "economic reality" filter to the situation at
DeCoster's Egg Farm, it could easily have found that the company relied
303. Id. (citation omitted).
304. 29 C.FR. 5 500.20(s)(1).
305. Ramirez, 194 F.R.D. at 357.
306. Id. at 357-58.
307. E.g., Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500 (1 lth Cir. 1993); Mar-
shall v. Coastal Growers Ass'n, 598 F2d 521,524 (9th Cir. 1979).
308. Marshall v. Coastal Growers Ass'n, 598 E2d (9th Cir. 1979).
309. Ramirez, 194 FR.D. at 357 (citation omitted).
310. Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 E2d 1500, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1993).
The court accepted that "[clourts uniformly recognized that migrant worker was 'a term
of art, having no reference to workers with migratory tendencies.' "(citations omitted)
311. Caro-Galvan, 993 F2d at 1507.
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upon a continuous turnover so that it could maintain its low wage scale.
The court could have imagined that workers, were in fact, rotating from
various seasonal jobs and DeCoster's was but one stopover in a continuum
of jobs that enabled them to work throughout the major portion of the
year.When considered in this fashion, the workers in Ramirez are no dif-
ferent than the fern harvesters in Caro-Galvan who moved to other
agricultural work when the market in ferns slowed. The burden of rebut-
ting this presumption should be, and generally is, born by the defendant.
By shifting the burden to the plaintiffs, the Ramirez court has only added
to the already imbalanced power position favoring the defendant. It is
precisely this imbalance that the Act intended to mitigate. To state, as
Ramirez does, with a straight face that there is little case law on the appel-
late level to support a broad interpretation of "migrant agricultural
worker" shows either a lack of interest or a docket that allows little time
to research the issues properly.
b. Class Action:A Shoe-In
Once it is established that the workers were, at least with respect to
the majority of case law, migrant workers, the ability to deny certification
of a class for any of the claims becomes very difficult.The high deference
accorded to the remedial nature of the Act should justify the application
of its liberal standards to any other claims incidental to its violations. Re-
viewing the discrimination claim, Judge Hornby refused to certify the
class on grounds that the damages sought were, for the most part, com-
pensatory and punitive and "because individual issues predominate[d]"
312
The court skipped over the first section of the federal rule regarding the
class action that mandates the existence of numerosity, commonality, typi-
cality and adequacy of representation. 3' Evidently it recognized that these
critical four requirements had been met and moved directly to the "fair-
ness" requirements of section (b) only one of which need be found to
justify certification.3 14 Had the court, however, performed an analysis of
section (a) in light of common law interpretations when considering vio-
lations of the Act, it is inconceivable that it would not have found that all
the claims met muster.
In light of the holding in Haywood v. Barnes that the number of
claimants required should be determined based upon the "expediency and
the inconvenience of trying individual lawsuits,"315 one thousand claimants
each demanding a jury trial easily clears the "numerosity" hurdle. The cir-
cumstances in Ramirez also meet the Haywood bar for "commonality" as
312. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 351.
313. FED. R. Civ. P 23(a).
314. FED. R. Ci. P 23(b).
315. 109 ER.D. 568,575 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
FALL 2001]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
representing "one common question out of many."'316 After all, the claim-
ants alleged broad housing and sanitation abuses, as well as
misrepresentation in the terms and conditions. 17 As previously discussed,
typicality exists regardless of whether there are factual differences such as
amount of damages and rests simply upon a similarity of legal theory. All
of the Ramirez claimants alleged poor housing conditions and misleading
terms of employment. Under Haywood, "typicality" existed. Finally, it is
fair to assume that the firm of Friedman, Babcock & Gaythwaite, a firm
very experienced in representing migrant workers, fulfilled the adequacy
of representation requirement.318
The court now only needed to find that one of the fairness issues
apply With regard to the discrimination claim, the court found that class
certification was unwarranted for the following reasons: individual issues
predorminated; the laborers sought primarily compensatory and punitive
damages; and demanded jury trials to assess them. 19 If the court, following
the advisory notes, arrived at a possibly valid interpretation of Fed. R. Civ.
P 23(b)(3) with respect to the discrimination claim, the same restrictive
interpretation would not have survived historical application when con-
sidering violations of the Act. Haywood has established that common
questions must merely reflect some "significant aspect of the case " '32 ° In
Ramirez, that "significant aspect" is the violation of the Act's mandate that
the employer provide adequate housing and properly disclose the terms
and conditions of employment. 2'
The court's second concern about the manageability of the case also
runs counter to the broad and remedial position of most courts. As articu-
lated in Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, common law
gives the court broad discretion with regard to damages and the form in
which they may be awarded. 22 The Ramirez court could have converted
the actual damage claim to one for liquid damages and then adopted
some general form of disbursement.323 That would have afforded a unitary
316. Id.
317. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 351.
318. Friedman, Babcock & Gaythwaite represented migrant workers in both the Rami-
rez and Cortes cases as well as the plaintiffs in Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 59 E
Supp. 2d 120 (D. Me. 1999) and Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 69 E Supp. 2d 168 (D.
Me. 1999).
319. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 351.
320. Haywood, 109 FR.D. at 581.
321. As an aside, one can also conclude that, with regard to the discrimination claim, it
should be sufficient that claimants fell within the same racial classification without consid-
ering the various differences in injuries suffered.
322. 904 F2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1990).
323. The plaintiffs did suggest that the trial be bifurcated. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 354.
They suggested that individualized damages be tried after a class action trial on liability. Id.
There is no reason that at this point the court could not have intervened and made it's
own suggestion that the damage claims be restructured to allow for a more equitable out-
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form of relief that in turn would not have necessitated proof of injury
from each member of the class. 324 At the same time, it would mitigate the
burden of expense that each member would carry if they were forced to
litigate in separate jury trials. The foregoing consideration would also cor-
roborate the fact that in such an instance, despite the court's assertion to
the contrary, class action would be the "superior" method of adjudica-
tion.
325
Although the court doubted the jury's ability to "weigh all of the
proof within the liability stage and then apply the presumption ... to each
of [the] ... individual workers" 326 the Salazar-Calderon solution seems
more reasonable. The jury could have been permitted to make a general
award determination and provide that the damages be disbursed equally
to each member of the class. Finally, the same analysis, once applied to the
discrimination claim as well, would weaken the court's argument that no
justification for class certification existed.The court needed to first recog-
nize that one of the purposes of the Act was to afford an underprivileged
class a viable method of redress for injuries received as a consequence of
the inequalities and vulnerabilities inherent in the class itself. Then the
court was bound to facilitate the means of achieving that redress or rem-
edy.To do otherwise flies in the face of Congressional intent and nullifies
the Act's effectiveness.
To conclude, the most disappointing aspect of the court's analysis is
that it did not even reach the question of class certification with regard to
violations of the Act. 327 It wedged itself immovably within a narrow and
come. This type of proactive measure is not uncommon in remedial suits concerning the
MSAWPA and would resolve the Ramirez court's management concerns.
324. One might argue that if one employed this logic, a class member could recover
without having been harmed. The convenience that certification of a class action would
afford the class members as a whole far outweighs the risk that some members would be
unduly compensated.
325. Here the objection might arise that class certification is confused with a review of
the merits. It must be remembered, however, that Judge Hornby chose to review the mer-
its as determinative whether class certification be considered.
326. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 354.
327. Id. at 355.The court maintained that that although FED. R. Crv. P 23(c)(1) man-
dates that the court shall make a determination as to class certification "as soon as
practicable:' there was ample support from other Circuits permitting it to go directly to
the merits and grant summary judgment. Ramirez, 194 ER.D. at 355.The damage caused
to the plaintiffs case by this tactic is further evidenced by the ruling Judge Hornby made
in July, 2001 with regard to an undisclosed settlement agreement reached by the parties
before the original case went to trial. Prior to the initial hearing of the class action suit in
Ramirez v. Decoster, 194 E.R.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000) (hereinafter Ramirez 1), the parties had
engaged in mediation. Ramirez v. DeCoster, 142 F Supp. 2d 104 (D. Me. 2001) (hereinafter
Ramirez I). They put together a "detailed and comprehensive settlement agreement:" 142
F Supp. 2d at 106. Senator Warren B. Rudman mediated the dispute in Portland, Maine. Id.
DeCoster agreed to settle the matter for six million dollars. Id. at 107. In exchange the
Ramirez class agreed to "use their best efforts to help lift" a very effective boycott which
F~ALL 2001]
Michigan journal of Race & Law
had resulted in reaction to the allegations against DeCoster. Id. After the decisions handed
down by Judge Hornby in the class action suit, the defendants (DeCoster) sought to take
advantage of their newly enhanced negotiating position and withdraw from the former
agreement on grounds that there was no "agreement to all material terms." Id. at 106.The
plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce with the Maine District Court. Id. After an evidentiary
hearing held in January, 2001, Judge Hornby of the Maine District Court ruled that the
agreement was enforceable. Id. at 106, 108.
Nevertheless, the settlement agreement was based upon a class action suit and had
to be approved by the court. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV P 23(e)). In response to the defen-
dants' charge that the agreement did not define the class scope,Judge Hornby replied:
[a]fter all, a motion for class certification had been filed, and the entire
dispute arises out of employment and housing relationships between the
plaintiffs and the DeCoster defendants. The only "scope" issues possible
were defining the ethnic group and the chronological years covered. It
was in the defendants' interest to have as broad a definition as possible for
all the obvious reasons. Although there was some later suggestion by the
plaintiffs to limit the class to plaintiffs of Mexican origin, when the de-
fendants objected, the plaintiffi' lawyers quickly agreed to the defendants'
definition that included all Hispanic plaintiffs.
Id. at 110. (citations omitted)
Judge Hornby, however, alluded that the real issue with regard to the class was "not
to the existence of an agreement among the parties, but to whether a class action settle-
ment is any longer possible in light of the fact that I have subsequently denied the motion
to certify the class.' Id. at 111 n.9 (citation omitted).Judge Hornby stated that in the case
of a "settlement-only class certification" the court does not have to consider "intractable
management problems" that would otherwise deny class certification under FED. R. CV. P.
23(b)(3)(D). Id. (quoting Amchem Prod., Inc., v.Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,620 (1997.
Finally, supporting my contention that there was no barrier to class action in the
initial suit, Judge Hornby stated: "My reasons for refusing to certify under 23(b)(3) were
based largely upon the difficulties of managing the resulting jury trial.Those difficulties are
not presented in a settlement. From all that appears, the class here meets the other re-
quirements of the Rule." Id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless,Judge Hornby left open the
possibility that the settlement agreement may not be approved under FED. R. Cmv. P. 23. Id.
at 116.
Judge Hornby was given the opportunity to address that point on October 15,
2001, four months after his preliminary ruling in Ramirez II. Ramirez v. DeCoster, No.
CIV 98-186-PH, 2001 WL 1231258 *1 (D. Me Oct. 15, 2001) [(hereinafter Ramirez 111)].
In Ramirez III, to enforce the entire prior agreement, Judge Hornby was asked to "make a
preliminary determination of fairness under FED. R. CIV P 23(e), and approve the distri-
bution of notice to the class in preparation for a final fairness hearing on the settlement."
Id. at *1. The description of the settlement class is "[a]ll current and former Hispanic em-
ployees of any of the Defendants and/or their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners,
predecessors, successors, principals, agents and assigns who worked at the DeCoster Egg
Farm between January 1, 1988 and February 21, 2000." Id. DeCoster objected, insisting
that performance of the settlement agreement with respect to the class is precluded by res
judicata as a result ofJudge Hornby's refusal to certify the class in Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194
ER.D. 348 (D.Me. 200) (Ramirez I). Id. Judge Hornby, in a tone of frustration caused by
the necessity to "revisit [his] earlier Order denying class certification:' stated that a differ-
ent, more "heightened attention" standard of review had to be applied with respect to
certifying a class "in the settlement context:' Id. at *2. Settlements are meant to eliminate
doubt of the outcome. Id. Because his MSAWPA ruling with respect to certification of a
[VOL. 7:195
A Balanced Remedy
misdirected evaluation of the definition of a "migrant worker"To assert, as
the court does, that "[t]he statutory language is clear and must control,"32 '
completely ignores the current of common law and contradicts the
court's own reliance on two cases to justify its interpretation. 329 Essentially,
the court applies the same scrutiny in reviewing measures specifically de-
signed to be remedial, as it does to the general law of contracts.330 The
court also took this same "plain wording" approach in its analysis of the
Cortes case.
class is still subject to appeal there is doubt as to the outcome. Id. This doubt breathes life
in to the settlement agreement with regard to the class. Id. In reviewing the requirements
for certification of a class, Judge Hornby now found that the requirements of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) were met, i.e.,joinder was impracticable, there were com-
mon questions of both law and fact, the representative parties' claims were typical of those
of the class, and that counsel for the class was adequate. Id. at *2-3.Acceding that the spirit
of his analysis in Ramirez III was inconsistent with that of Ramirez I, he proceeded to re-
visit his former rulings on commonality/typicality as well as summary judgment
preclusion of the fraud and breach of contract claims. Id. at *3. Again, using a more liberal
analysis, Judge Hornby found that these two elements did not bar certification. Id. at *4.
He concluded that:"[i]f these conclusions are deemed inconsistent with my earlier ruling,
then I overrule the earlier ruling." Id. Revealing a repressed ire, Judge Hornby asserted
that any mistakes made in Ramirez I should be taken care of in Ramirez III to clean up a
mess caused by the "procedural nightmare" induced by the "undisclosed settlement" Id.
Dispensing with the required ability to manage the litigation, Judge Hornby found that
the class also complies with Rule 23(b). Id. at *5.
Pointing out that his initial concern in Ramirez I was that damages would vary per-
son to personJudge Hornby, in Ramirez III conceded that "the common questions of law
or fact predominate over the questions affecting only individual members." Id. In striking
contrast to his earlier refusal, in Ramirez I, to embrace the underlying remedial intent of
the law, Judge Hornby admitted, in Ramirez III, that "[i]n the absence of a class action, it is
likely that most members of the class will never have any recovery. [Consequently,] ... class
action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication." Id. DeCoster argued in
Ramirez III that the Ramirez I finding that the "class cannot be certified to the fraud and
contract claims" was res judicata and to honor the settlement without those terms would
require the court to modify the contract; something the court was not permitted to do. Id.
at *6. In contrast to Judge Hornby's previous insistence, in Ramirez I, not to go beyond the
"four corners" of the Act in applying relief, in Ramirez III, he implied that DeCoster's
obvious attempt to circumvent the settlement terms was bad faith. Id. at *7. Accordingly,
Judge Hornby certified the class for all the claims including fraud and contract and
warned: "[i]f the Court of Appeals determines that I cannot certify the fraud and contract
claims, then I will certify the class as described but without those claims and enforce the
settlement agreement accordingly" Id. at *8.
In summaryJudge Hornby, now apparently recognizes that his decision in Ramirez
I subjected an already vulnerable class to further abuse by giving DeCoster fodder to in-
validate a pre-trial settlement in the form of a summary judgment on the issue of class
certification. To his credit, however, Judge Hornby attempts in Ramirez III, with an air of
humility, to rectify his mistake in Ramirez I, i.e., he apparently has recognized the wolf
beneath the wool suit.
328. Ramirez, 190 FR.D. at 357.
329. Id. at 357-58.
330. Id. at 358-59.
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2. Cortes v. Superior Forestry Services, Inc.
a. Workmens' Compensation vs. the Remedial Intent of the Act
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court in deciding Adams Fruit
Co., Inc. v. Barret?31 held that State remedies could not supercede Federal
remedies unless Congress expressly provided for such an exemption.332
More narrowly, the Court held that Florida's state compensation remedy
did not preempt an award for actual damages under § 1854 of the Act.333
In 1995, Congress enacted and President Clinton signed Public Law 104-
49, which, in effect, reversed the narrow holding of Adams Fruit.334 The
law is a result of concern that the Adams Fruit decision would adversely
affect the farmers' ability to compete in a world market if they were sub-
jected to a "dual liability [system] for their employees' workplace
injuries."33 s The law, however, is the product of a bipartisan effort to pro-
tect both farmer and worker.36 On the one hand, section one protects the
farmer from the obligation to pay significant tort damages.337 On the
other hand, section two provides for substantially increased statutory cov-
erage if the injury is a result of specified circumstances. 33 Although
Congress recognized that it could not give preferential treatment to a class
with regard to state workmens' compensation programs, it refused to re-
move the imperative remedial foundation of the Act by increasing
statutory awards for abuses commonly found with regard to transportation
of the migrant laborer.
The exception did not intend to eviscerate the remedial and protec-
tive measures of § 1841. Section 1841(c)(1) merely permits an employer
to replace the insurance requirement of § 1841(b)(1)(C) with its work-
mens' compensation insurance. 339 The Section expressly states that it does
not exempt those circumstances that are not covered by the state's work-
331. 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
332. Id. at 647-49.
333. Id. at 650-51.
334. Monte B. Lake, Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett: Restoration of Workers' Compensation as
the Exclusive Remedy for Workplace Injuries Under the Federal Migrant Law, 6 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRic. L. REv. 69, 69 (1996).
335. Id. at 74-75.
336. Id. at 83.
337. Id. at 85 (referring to the amendment to § 504(d) of the MSAWPA).
338. Id. at 86-87.The maximum award for statutory damages was raised from $500 to
$10,000 if any of four situations were present. The four fact patterns necessary are: (1)
defendant knowingly allowed a driver to transport the workers under the influence of
alcohol; (2) defendant had a record of prior MWSAPA motor violations; (3) defendant
knowingly alters or removes a safety device required under the Act; and (4) violations of
§ 1841(b) (compliance to vehicular standards and regulations) when defendant is not
properly registered under MSAWPA. Id.
339. 29 U.S.C.§ 1841(c).
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mens' compensation law.34 In such cases, the employer is to carry an addi-
tional "insurance policy or liability bond."34 ' It is this fundamental
concern of preserving the worker's protection while not unduly burden-
ing the employer that the Cortes court severely eroded by granting
summary judgment to the defendant.
b. "Business as Usual"Analysis
The Cortes court, consistent with the Ramirez court, applied a "busi-
ness-as-usual" analysis of the Act with total disregard for the peculiar and
unique circumstances of the migrant worker. The court based its decision
on two cases, both of which dealt with a world far from the one the Act
meant to protect.
The first case, Boyce v. Potter,342 involved two painters who traveled to
a worksite together and were involved in an accident. 343 After the accident,
both received workmens' compensation benefits. The passenger, Boyce,
subsequently filed a negligence action against Potter, the driver.344 The
court found that Boyce and Potter were "traveling employees" because
travel was an "integral part of their job;" they were required to travel to
various worksites without a fixed location; and their employer compen-
sated them for their travel. 34 Thus, the court reasoned, the greater risk
exposure was an inherent characteristic of their employment. 346 Because
there was a "causal connection" between the accident and the employ-
ment, the activity was not exempted under the "ride-share" provision.
34
1
In the second case, Croteau-Robinson v. Merrill Trust/Fleet Bank,348 a
woman caught her shoe on a step as she descended a shuttle bus that
transported her to and from a company provided parking lot and work.
349
She had just returned from lunch.3 1 In this case, the plaintiff received
money from the employer that covered the span of time from the date of
injury to the date that workmens' compensation benefits would be re-
ceived.311 Upon filing for award, she was denied. 3 2 The case ended up in
the Supreme Judicial Court's lap because the State Appellate Division of
340. § 1841(c)(1).
341. § 1841(c)(2).
342. 642 A.2d 1342 (Me. 1994).




347. Id. at 1344 (citing ME: Rv. STAT.ANN. tit. 39,§ 201(2)(West Supp. 1993)).
348. 669 A.2d 763 (Me. 1996).
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Workmens' Compensation had ceased to exist and was replaced by the
Workmens'Compensation Board, which in turn refused to review any
pending cases.3"3 The plaintiff claimed that the summary refusal of the
board to hear her appeal was a violation of her state constitutional rights
of due process and equal opportunity."4 The court reasoned that the
"ride-share" exemption did not apply to short jaunts back and forth from
a parking lot to work."' In this case, it must be noted that the plaintiff was
seeking to be covered by workmens' compensation benefits. 6
c. Another Look With the Act in Mind
Neither of these cases applies to the protections intended by the Act.
The Congressional intent of the Act was to recognize and protect the mi-
grant worker against those dangers to which the worker was vulnerable
by the very nature of his work.3 Reliance upon the employer's mode of
transportation is one of those inherent vulnerabilities. The amendment to
the Act does not make workmens' compensation insurance the sole rem-
edy in all cases. In Cortes, unlike the cases cited by the court, the workers
had no alternative form of transportation. Just as an employer sponsored
car-pool maintains full responsibility for the costs of the transportation, so
did Superior. It must be remembered that Superior had picked up the
workers in Tilley, Arkansas and had every intention of returning the work-
ers to Tilley when they had completed their work. Although one does not
think of such long distances and duration of time when imagining an av-
erage "commute," it was indeed a commute. In addition, the accident
occurred when the van was transporting the workers from their tempo-
rary "home" to the worksite. These were not small jaunts to a parking lot.
Nor were they "traveling employees." Migrant workers create temporary
homes as they travel. For migrant workers, car-pooling is a way of life.
The Act is very specific as to what constitutes an inherent risk of
employment.35 It is careful to exclude from its protection any transporta-
tion done in the course of employment. 9 Riding a tractor in the course
of performing farm duties is not considered under the section.36 ° On the
other hand, transporting employees on a tractor from their homes to the
353. Id. at 764 n.2.
354. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, 5 320 (West Supp. 1994)).
355. Id. at 765.
356. Id.
357. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.





worksite is clearly covered.36 In short, the Act takes a realistic position
when it considers what activities constitute employment.
It has been said that Congress' intent is to make the workmens'
compensation exclusion very narrow.362 Congress intends to exclude only
transportation that is "incidental" to the actual job.363 This illustrates how
important it is that courts not treat circumstances surrounding migrant
workers as "business-as-usual." With respect to the plight of the migrant
workers, the landscape changes, the rules change, and the definition of
terms change. In Cortes, there were several violations of the safety provi-
sions of § 1841 that were beyond the scope of workmens' compensation
insurance. By amending § 1841, Congress never intended to permit an
employer to shield himself from the Act by making state workmens' com-
pensation the sole remedy. This is inconsistent with Congress's intent as
historically interpreted by the common law. It cannot be emphasized
enough that Congress intended that all exceptions be interpreted nar-
rowly because the Act is a remedial statute.36 Had the court reflected a
moment upon its remedial obligations and looked to the intent of both
the Act and the MWCA, it is difficult to accept that it would not have
applied the remedy provided by the car-pool statute to the alleged fla-
grant violations of transportation safety.36 Nevertheless, in reality, it
appears that the district court in Maine has refused to recognize the spe-
cial nature and circumstances surrounding the life of a migrant worker.
This attitude, however, not only sets it at odds with other Maine courts
and legislature,"6 but with national and international trends as well.
361. Soto v. McLean, 20 F Supp. 2d 901,911 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
362. Id. at 911-12.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 912.
365. One can only guess how Justice Godfrey, in light of Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms,
would have interpreted the statute.
366. In 1997, the Maine legislature enacted two laws that addressed the situation of
migrant workers. One serves as a backup for the federal act with respect to housing stan-
dards. ME. R-Ev. STAT. ANrN. tit. 26, § 585 586 588 (West Supp. 2000). (The Housing
Standards for Agricultural Workers defines an owner of such housing; applies standards
identical to those in the MSWPA; and makes violation of the standards a civil crime).The
other intends to focus special assistance on the migrant worker population of the State.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1404 (West Supp. 2000). The Migrant and Immigrant Assis-
tance. Outreach Project gives the Dept. of Labor the mandate to promote in coordination
with employers, unions and associated groups the education of laws applicable to the mi-
grants; facilitation of language interpretation sources and English as a second language
programs; assistance "workers in obtaining services necessary to improve their health and
safety and broaden their employment opportunities;" and any efforts to advocate for the
redress of grievances or claims by way of providing access to legal services. Both of these
laws not only recognize the need to afford special protection and remedial resources in
case of abuses to the migrant worker but also take an affirmative step to attempt to ensure
that they are not always vulnerable. That is, that by helping to educate the workers and
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VI. SUGGESTED METHODS FOR MAINTAINING THE TENSION
A. International Alternatives
A need for proactive legislation with regard to migrant workers
propelled a very important, although seemingly impractical international
instrument to the foreground. In 1979, the United Nations General
Assembly, led by Mexico, requested that an international working group
draft a convention dealing with the general human rights of migrant
workers in their countries of employment.36 7 This convention differs from
several International Labor Organization instruments36 in that it also
covers the migrant worker's family members.369 The convention, The
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (Convention), was finally opened
for signatories in 1990."'0 The final version exhibits a comprehensive
listing of human rights specifically directed at the migrant worker and
members of his family 71 The instrument attempts to answer to what
extent the standard of protection for migrant workers is to be determined
by the State to which he migrates?
32
There was a tremendous amount of controversy concerning the
definitions of "migrant worker" and to what extent undocumented mi-
grants were to be protected under the Convention. 3 3 Part I (Articles 1
through 6) lays out the definition of terms. 374 Article 1 defines the scope
of the "migration process" as spanning from the point at which prepara-
tion for departure is begun to the time the migrant and his family
providing them with special resources, they will not always possess the qualities that make
them vulnerable to the abuses that gave rise to a need for the Act in the first place.
367. Linda S. Bosniak, State Sovereignty, Human Rights and the New UN Migrant Workers
Convention, 86 AM. Soc'v INr'L L. PROC. 634, 634 (1992).
368. E.g., Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promo-
tion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, ILO/C143 (1975)
and Convention Concerning Migration for Employment, ILO/C97(1949), available at
www.ilo.org. Neither one of these Conventions have been ratified by the United States.
369. Bosniak, supra note 367, at 634.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. res. 45/158, 45 U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49A, at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49, art. 1 (1990) (hereinafter Int'l Migrant Workers
Conv.) The preamble of the Convention states that being fully aware of the "migration
phenomenon, which involves millions of people and affects a large number of States in the
international community" its intent was to "establish norms which may contribute to the
harmonization of the attitudes of States through the acceptance of basic principles con-
cerning the treatment of migrant workers and members of their families." Id.
373. Bosniak, supra note 367, at 636.
374. Int'l Conv., supra note 372.
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return.31 Section one of Article 1, in its prohibition of any form of dis-
crimination, also applies these protections to undocumented migrants.
37 6
Article 2 defines a "migrant worker" as anyone who is or has been em-
ployed for any compensable "activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national"377 The "seasonal worker" is by definition one whose work is de-
pendent upon the seasons.37 The category of "itinerant worker" is added
to the list as a migrant worker who must go to another "State or States for
short periods."
3 79
The Convention does not apply to State officials or representatives
of international organizations.3"' Nor does it apply to investors, refugees,
students or workers employed offihore.38' Finally, the "State of origin" is
the State of which the worker is a national.3"' Because many of the Arti-
cles, in the aggregate, form a comprehensive listing of human rights
already contained in other instruments, it can be inferred that they have
been interpreted to protect the unique vulnerabilities of the migrant phe-
nomenon.
38 3
The Convention is very controversial and as of April 18, 2001, only
sixteen States have ratified it.3 4 Twenty States must ratify the Convention
before it can enter into force.3 " Although its prospects are not good, it
may become a "normative benchmark for groups working to improve the
status of migrants."386 The Convention may serve as a springboard for
other possible alternatives to the highly unpredictable and arbitrary treat-
ment of this special class of workers.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at art. 2.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at art. 3.
381. Id.
382. Id. at art. 6.
383. Id. Other applicable Articles include Article 10 which prohibits "degrading treat-
ment or punishment' Id. at art. 10; Article 12 which guarantees the right to religious
freedom, Id. at art. 12;Article 25 insists upon the right to good work conditions, Id. at art
25; the right to social security, Id. at art 27; the right to emergency medical care, Id. at art
28; and the right to education Id. at art. 30.
384. Statistics are available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.
385. Id.
386. Bosniak, supra note 367, at 638.
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B. National Alternatives
In some respects, there is a tendency today to turn back the clocks to
the time of the "bracero" program of the 40s and 50s. 3 7 Congress is re-
viewing the H-2A federal program that permits Mexican migrant
workers to enter the U.S. for a specified period.3 11 Recent estimates calcu-
late that there are over 800,000 illegal migrant farmers in the U.S., or 52
percent of all farm workers." 9 The Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) enacted by Congress in 1986 attempted to remedy this prob-
lem. 390 The IRCA, for the first time, made the employment of an illegal
migrant punishable by fine or incarceration.39' On the other hand, the
IRCA offered an amnesty provision.39 2 The provision grants both legal
status to undocumented workers who have been in the U.S. since 1982
and, through the Special Agricultural Workers program, permits illegal
workers with perishable crop experience to apply for permanent resident
status.393 A major purpose of the IRCA is to insure the legal rights of an
important part of the U.S. economy, the migrant worker.394 It has failed,
however, to stem the flow of undocumented migrants.
Despite the 1986 U.S. amnesty permitting the absorption of 1.1 mil-
lion illegal Mexican migrants, Congress is currently considering an
extension of that amnesty to protect the estimated 800,000 workers cur-
rently employed on U.S. farms. 39 The purpose of the amnesty is to relieve
the tensions between farmers using such labor, agencies attempting to
enforce the laws that prohibit the practice of employing illegal migrants,
and those complying with the tedious and burdensome "redtape" of the
"guest worker program." 39 6
In 1995, Congress amended the awkward H-2 guest worker program
and renamed it the H-2A program.3 7 This program is designed to facili-
tate the importation of foreign labor by agricultural employers in times of
need. 98 The government issues non-immigrant visas for H-2A workers
after the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), approves the employer's petition to bring in
387. Anthony DePalma, 'A Tyrannical Situation' Farmers Caught in Conflict Over Illegal
Migrant Workers, N.YTIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at C1.
388. Id.
389. Id.





395. DePalma, supra note 387.
396. Id. See also Ross, supra note 43, at 276.




workers.399 The DOJ cannot accept the application until the DOL has
approved the terms of employment, e.g., wages and working conditions.4
The United States Department of Agriculture performs surveys to deter-
mine wage scales." 1 Because the H-2A program is designed to protect the
U.S. agricultural worker as much as it is to facilitate the use of foreign
migrants by United States' farmers, it creates a tension that ultimately
frustrates all concerned.
In Vega v. Nourse Farms, Inc.,4°2 the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts found that there was a genuine question of fact
concerning an apple farm's liability for damages pursuant to both the "H-
2A provisions" of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and the
Act. 03 Anticipating a labor shortage, the apple farm requested former
workers from Puerto Rico to sign in at the local employment agency to
accept the offer and prepare for the trip.4 °4 At the same time, the farm ap-
plied for H-2A certification with the Employment Training Agency for
approval to hire eight foreign workers.4"' However, due to technical and
clerical errors the Puerto Rican workers were not able to formally accept
the offer until the same week that the foreign workers were arriving from
Jamaica.' Approximately a week later, the farm told the Division of Em-
ployment Training that it no longer needed the Puerto Rican Workers,
some of whom had already embarked on their trip to the farm.0 7 In such
situations the H-2A program requires that the employer hire the domestic
workers for a minimum of fifty-percent of the available time.0 8 The court
399. Id. at 276-77.
400. Id. at 277.
401. Id.
402. 62 F Supp. 2d 334 (D. Mass. 1999).
403. Id. at 340-46 (finding that the plaintiffi had a private right of action as remedy for
damages incurred due to violations of the "H2-A provision" of the INA as amended, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(H)(ii), § 1188 and 20 C.ER. § 655.0 et seq. and the AWPA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1821 et seq.)
404. Id. at 338.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 338-39.
407. Id. at 339.
408. Id. at 335-38.The court explains that in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act which, among other things, divided H-2 workers into temporary
agricultural workers (H-2A workers)and non-agricultural workers (H-2B workers). See id.
at 335. In order to qualify for approval to use foreign workers the applicant must be able
to show that it has used all available domestic workers through positive recruitment and
that the employment of the foreign workers will in no way affect adversely the "wages and
working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed." Id. at 336. After
the applicant has submitted his request a copy of it automatically goes to the interstate
clearance system by way of the employer's local public employment office. See id.The ICS
in turn searches the U.S. for potential workers to fill the positions available. See id. at 337.
Once the H-2A workers depart their homeland any domestic workers recruited by the
ICS or as a result of the "positive recruitment" of the employer are guaranteed an
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found that the stipulated facts showed a violation of the IRCA with re-
gard to the fifty-percent rule; a violation of the Act which requires that
full disclosure of working terms and conditions be provided prior to the
departure of the migrant worker; and various breach of contract laws." 9
The H-2A program also harbors several administrative problems.410 A
sixty-day advance notice of needed labor causes employers to submit
applications in anticipation of work that may or may not materialize.
4
11
This in turn can leave migrant workers without income until work
arrives.4 12 Finally, delays and inefficient processing of applications
combined with the complexity of the program creates confusion and risk
of noncompliance on the part of the applicants. 413 Suggested solutions
range from a need to amend the existing immigration laws, to a complete
elimination of restrictions on the flow of migrant workers within the
American continents.
One attempt to rectify the problem came from Representative Rich-
ard W Pombo who introduced H.R. 4548 on May 25, 2000.4' The Bill
proposed to grant an unlimited number of new "H-2C" visas to be valid
employment term equivalent to fifty-percent of the required work period. See id. At the
same time this rule exonerates the employer "from his employment obligations to the
displaced [foreign] worker." Id. In no case shall the employer "treat domestic workers hired
under [the fifty-percent] rule less favorably than the H-2A workers. See id.There are only
two exceptions to the fifty-percent rule: if a person "willfully and knowingly withhold[s]
domestic workers" to force hire or, if certified to do so, an agricultural association chooses
to transfer the workers to a different site See id.
409. Id. at 340-46.
410. Ross, supra note 43, at 277.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. In a House Report regarding the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Pro-
gram, a grower testified that:
[t]he current H-2A temporary agricultural worker program is not work-
ing for three principal reasons. One is the structural problems built into
the program. [The Department of Labor] ignored some of the most im-
portant of the H-2A streamlining provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act. [Second,] the program is administered in a highly adver-
sarial fashion. DOL regards H-2A applicants as potential, if not actual,
lawbreakers and acts as though its mission is to keep employers out of the
program rather than to help them use this program which Congress pro-
vided. The third reason the program is not working has to do with
compliance enforcement and litigation. So-called farmworker advocates
have for years strongly opposed the H-2A program.They have made both
the DOL and H-2A users targets for harassment and litigation.They have
attempted to accomplish in the courts what they were unable to accom-
plish in Congress.
H.R. REP. No. 106-1048 (2001), 2001 WL 67919.
414. Agricultural Opportunities Act of 2000, H.R. 4548,106th Cong. (2000).
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up to ten months with a possible extension of two additional months."'
The Bill also proposed creating a "central registry of American agricul-
tural workers" under the Labor Department which would automatically
make foreign workers available if there were no qualified American work-
ers to do the job. 16 Nevertheless, its thrust was to protect the interests of
U.S. agricultural workers and farmers, and leaves any protection of foreign
migrant agricultural workers to the Act.
Vicente Fox, the President of Mexico, has proposed that Mexican
workers be permitted "to cross the Rio Grande as easily as the products
that make up the $196 billion in two-way trade." '17 In his view, the
worker is "an asset" to be considered as a commodity to be traded freely
in a free market economy.18 At first glance this suggestion appears to be as
radical and unworkable as the Convention; however, it starts to become
more attractive as the cry for relief from the United States farmers takes
on an increasingly cacophonous tone.419 The U.S. farmers are listening to
President Fox when he points out the absurdity of spending over $1 bil-
lion to patrol the U.S. border with M~xico when the U.S. businesses need
the workers. 420 It does not seem to make sense to spend money on a system
that is not working.2 1 The need for labor is fueling a competition that can
only benefit the migrant, whether in terms of better housing designed es-
pecially for the migrant phenomenon,42 2 or aggressive recruitment by a state
governor to replace a rapidly aging workforce. 2 At any rate, whatever solu-
tion surfaces will have to balance the considerations of the farmers' needs
with the enforcement of laws aimed at the protection of their workers-
legal and illegal.
415. Id.
416. Id. The registry mechanism reduced the waiting period from 45 days under the
H-2A program to 28 days. It also provided emergency measures to protect the needs of
the grower. It still barred the hiring of illegal aliens and place its emphasis upon the pro-
tection of American workers first, American growers second and leaves any protection of
the foreign migrant worker to existing remedial statutes. See id.




421. Id. The article quotes the General Accounting Office as estimating that 52% of the
1.6 million farm workers are in the U.S. illegally
422. Julie V lovine, Not Just a Roof, but Roots for a Season, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at
D1 (discussing housing designed with the migrant worker in mind as an inducement to
work for a Pennsylvania fruit farmer).
423. Pam Beluck, Short of People, Iowa Seeks to be Ellis Island of Midwest, N.YTIMEs,Aug.
28, 2000, at Al. (Governor Tom Vilsack of Iowa proposed setting up "immigration enter-
prise zones").
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VII. CONCLUSION
There has been a gradual evolution in the agricultural sector. It cor-
responds with the increased need for labor and the ability to access it
when and where it is most effective. This need and the need to protect the
labor force, if for no other reason than to guarantee its future availability,
creates a tension in the law. The Act represents an attempt to maintain a
balance between these two forces.To properly serve both interests, the Act
must be susceptible to growth and change.When an imbalance occurs on
either side of the fulcrum, Congress will be expected to react and to rees-
tablish equilibrium. Congress, however, does not oversee nor adjudicate its
laws. The judiciary interprets the laws so they can be properly enforced. To
properly enforce the law, there will have to be clear judicial guidelines.
These guidelines, in turn, must reflect the intent of the law. When provi-
sions of the law are intended to be remedial, common law demands that
they be interpreted broadly in a light most favorable to the protected
party. A "plain reading" of the statute cannot be tolerated if it fails to serve
the interest of the migrant worker.
This remedial nature will not be confined to the Act, but must flow
over into the application of any other statute that may be incidental to the
case at hand. In reviewing cases involving the migrant worker, it can never
be business-as-usual. Rather, the spirit of the Act and international con-
cern as reflected in the Convention should prevail and color the
interpretation of all appropriate statutes that might touch on the lives of
the migrant workers.
Finally, in interpreting a federal law, state and federal courts should
review it within the context of the judicial opinions of all fifty states. Do-
ing otherwise, jeopardizes the intended remedy and defeats its deterrence
effect. The Ramirez and Cortes decisions stand as inexplicable variances in
the law-examples of anomalies to be avoided. The enormous imbalance
of power between a migrant worker and the employer demands that there
be a rebuttable presumption of the defendant's liability. To describe the
workers as migratory, thereby giving one the sense that they do not be-
long, is terribly misleading. In a sense, they are citizens of every state they
visit and will not, as Wally would have us believe, go away
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